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A b stract
This thesis presents three papers that to contribute to our theoretical knowledge on economic growth 
and secular stagnation.
Chapter 2 (which constituted my Job Market paper) presents a theory in which economic development 
manifests itself primarily as a process of sectoral differentiation. As the variety of sectors expands, 
the allocation of heterogeneously talented individuals improves. The paper shows that, in addition to 
increasing the average productivity of the matches between agents and sectors, this process also mitigates 
informational frictions affecting the functioning of financial markets. The positive impact of sectoral 
variety 011 the efficiency of financial markets gives rise to a novel feedback between financial development 
and horizontal innovations, which may yield different types of dynamics. A successful economy typically 
exhibits a continuous increase in the variety of productive activities, which in turn leads to lower frictions 
in the financial markets. However, a poverty-trap may also arise. This situation is characterised by a 
rudimentary productive structure with poor matching of skills to activities, and where the operation of 
financial markets is severely affected by the talent mismatching.
Chapter 3 proposes a theory of insurance market imperfections along the path of development based 
011 the endogenous emergence of informational asymmetries during development. The source of the in­
efficiency in the insurance market is private information regarding entrepreneurial skills. Development 
is driven by the action of the entrepreneurs, and materialises when the agents best suited for under­
taking entrepreneurial activities fully exercise their skills. Yet, due to private information, an adverse 
selection problem endogenously arises when the prospective entrepreneurs intend to diversify away their 
idiosyncratic risks. The adverse selection problem prevents the provision of first-best insurance contracts 
against entrepreneurial risks, which may discourage entrepreneurial investment and halt the process of 
development.
Chapter 4 (written in collaboration with Vincenzo Merella, from Birkbeck College) turns the attention  
towards a world economy. The past literature on trade has explored conditions under which international 
trade might be a factor magnifying income disparities between the advanced North and the backward 
South. No attention has yet been placed on the effect of trade on countries that do not display substantial 
dissimilarities concerning capital endowments and income per head. The paper shows that even when no 
single country is technologically more advanced than any other one and productivity changes are uniform 
and identical in all countries, international trade may still be the source of income divergence. Divergence 
will be experienced when comparative advantages induce patterns of specialisation that, although optimal 
for each country at some initial point in time, do not offer the same scope for improvements in terms of 
subsequent quality upgrading of final products.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
The standard Neoclassical growth model - i.e. Solow (1956) and Cass (1965) - predicts 
that poor economies should catch up with rich economies. As a result, income dispari­
ties across countries should tend to vanish over time. However, except for a handful of 
successful experiences in East Asia, in the past fifty years income disparities across coun­
tries have not in general substantially shrunk, and more remarkably they have actually 
widened between the top and bottom end of the distribution - see, for instance, Jones 
(1997) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005). In fact, evidence on distribution dynamics 
in Quah (1993, 1996) suggests that the world income distribution has been converging 
towards a bimodal distribution. The observation that income differences in the world 
have proven long-lasting has spawned the concept of poverty-traps in the economic de­
velopment literature. In other words, poor countries might not be catching up with rich 
countries because they are stuck in a low-development long-run equilibrium.
The first theoretical attempts to explain why poverty-traps may emerge have mainly 
focused on the existence of technological non-convexities and the presence of spillovers 
which could lead to coordination failures in the aggregate economy. Among the most 
prominent papers in this vein are: Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Aziariadis and 
Drazen (1990), Matsuyama (1991), Durlauf (1993), and Zilibotti (1995).
A subsequent strand of literature initiated by the papers by Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) has turned to investigate the effects of financial markets 
imperfections arising from informational asymmetries on the process of development.1 As 
a general feature, this literature predicts that the presence of imperfections in financial 
markets prevents the poor from starting up investment projects or from accumulating 
human capital, which would be optimal in a first-best environment. As a consequence, 
the initial wealth distribution will play a key role in determining the development path
‘Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), and Lloyd-Ellis and Berhardt, (2000), are among the first 
papers that followed this analytical approach.
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followed by different economies. In particular, this literature shows that when the fraction 
of poor agents is large enough, an economy might get stuck in an under-development 
trap, where typically output is low, social mobility is constrained, and the operation of 
financial markets is highly inefficient. The next two chapters in this thesis (Chapter 2 
and 3 ) mainly contribute to this latter strand of literature by two separate angles.2
Chapter 2 presents a theory in which the variety of productive activities in the econ­
omy expands during the process of development. The main claim of this theory states 
that this process of sectoral differentiation leads to improvements in the allocation of 
skills, and, as a by-product, helps to mitigate informational frictions affecting the oper­
ation of financial markets. This idea relies on the presumption that skills are subject to 
private information. As a result, an adverse selection problem linked to the allocation of 
talent emerges in case agents need to obtain credit in order to exercise their skills (i.e., 
in case they need credit to start up their entrepreneurial investment projects). In that 
sense, a larger variety of sectors leads to better operation of the credit market because, 
by facilitating the sorting of heterogeneous skills, it in turn raises the average quality of 
the pool of credit applicants.
In this theory, the variety of activities is itself endogenous. In particular, it is the 
result of the optimal behaviour of specific agents (inventors) who seek to produce new 
ideas (inventions) to sell to the entrepreneurs. Since inventors appropriate part of the 
surplus generated by their ideas, and since this surplus is increasing in the amount of 
entrepreneurial investment, a source of positive interaction between financial develop­
ment and innovation activities arises. More precisely, on the one hand, more efficient 
operation of financial markets spurs the incentives to invest in R&D, because it fosters 
entrepreneurial investment. On the other hand, higher investment in R&D contributes 
to financial development, because it expands the variety of sectors helping to alleviate 
the adverse selection problem. This positive interaction can give rise to multiple long- 
run dynamics in the economy. In same cases, the economy grows and develops into a 
diversified productive structure, enjoying good allocation of skills and efficient operation 
of credit markets. In other cases, the economy falls into a poverty-trap, characterised 
by a very rudimentary productive structure, poor sorting of talent, and highly inefficient 
operation of credit markets.
In Chapter 3, I study the long-run consequences of imperfect risk-sharing in an econ­
omy populated with heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs. In this chapter, entrepre­
neurial talent is again private information. The ensuing adverse selection problem pre­
vents the provision of first-best insurance contracts, which are needed to support risky
2 Chapter 2 has constituted ray Job Market paper.
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entrepreneurial activities. Lack of full insurance will naturally discourage first-best risk- 
taking. Furthermore, under the (realistic) assumption that risk aversion is decreasing in 
income, the poor refrain from undertaking risky projects more strongly than the rich do. 
This chapter shows that when entrepreneurial projects are highly productive but very 
risky, insurance under-provision may discourage entrepreneurship so drastically that a 
poverty-trap may arise, even if the production technology is convex.
Besides its own theoretical appeal, the ultimate intention of Chapter 3 is to start 
filling the current gap in the development literature in the context of heterogeneous 
agents and asymmetric information. This literature has so far extensively studied the 
long-run effects of credit constrains. But, surprisingly, it has placed very little attention 
on the dynamic implications of insurance under-provision in poor economies. In that 
regard, the findings presented in Chapter 3 add further theoretical arguments to the 
already well established view that imperfect risk-sharing is in itself a really serious issue, 
and can severely affect the efficiency of economies in the long run.
Chapter 4 (written in collaboration with Vincenzo Merella) turns the attention to­
wards a world economy where countries are linked by international trade of consumption 
goods. This essay’s starting point goes back to the traditional Ricardian view of interna­
tional specialisation, where trade patterns are governed by countries’ comparative advan­
tages. Within such a framework, we build a model with non-homothetic preferences in 
which different economies might follow divergent income dynamic paths as a consequence 
of the (either favorable or unfavourable) evolution of their terms of trade. Our model’s 
main results are in line with the old hypothesis by Prebish (1950) and Singer (1950); i.e., 
that international trade exerts a negative impact on poorer economies, because these 
economies tend to specialise in commodities with low income demand elasticity, and 
hence experience a secular tendency of declining terms of trade.
A particularly interesting feature of the model is that, by relying on a quality-ladder 
framework a-la Grossman and Helpman (1991), it allows for divergent income paths 
without exogenously imposing any sort of initial absolute advantages for any specific 
country. In fact, the world-economy featured in this chapter undergoes a long initial 
phase of "primitive accumulation", during which all countries display identical income. 
Only once world’s productivity surpasses some threshold do income disparities across 
countries start to arise. This particular type of dynamics not only contrasts with previous 
literature in the subject -  e.g. Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Matsuyama 
(2000) -, but also seems to be in line with the world income distribution dynamics before 
and after the Industrial Revolution -  see Galor (2005).
C hapter 2
Sectoral D ifferentiation, A llocation  o f Talent, and 
Financial D evelopm ent
2.1 In trod u ction
Over the course of development, the variety of productive activities in the economy 
tends to increase in conjunction with the aggregate stock of capital and output. This 
observation implies that economic development partly manifests itself as a process of 
sectoral diversification. Such a dynamic pattern had initially been suggested by Adam 
Smith (1776) in his discussion on the division of labour and its relation with the size 
of the market ( The Wealth of Nations, chapter 3). I propose here a theory in which 
this process of sectoral diversification helps to mitigate frictions affecting the operation 
of financial markets and, thereby, fosters financial development. The degree of sectoral 
differentiation is itself endogenous, and it is in fact positively influenced by the level of 
financial development. As a result, sectoral differentiation and financial markets efficiency 
interplay with each other, and this positive interaction becomes a fundamental ingredient 
that shapes the pattern of development followed by different economies.
The paper studies the evolution of an economy populated by heterogeneous individ­
uals in terms of entrepreneurial skills. More precisely, individuals in this economy are 
characterized by distinct comparative advantages concerning entrepreneurial activities. 
Entrepreneurial skills are, however, private information. This feature gives rise to an 
adverse selection problem linked to the allocation of entrepreneurial talent and generates 
the main friction that contaminates the operation of the economy.
The paper argues that this informational friction does not remain constant along 
the process of development. In particular, given skills heterogeneity, sectoral variety 
permits better sorting of agents to activities. Consequently, if individuals need credit 
to start up their projects, this fact would then raise the quality of the pool of credit
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applicants. In that regard, adverse selection here stems from an underlying problem 
of scarcity of sectors, because this hinders the efficient sorting of (unobservable) talent. 
When the variety of sectors is small, a large number of agents have no other choice but 
specializing in activities for which they might not be exceptionally talented. Asymmetric 
information concerning skills, in turn, spreads the consequences of talent mismatching 
to other sectors in the economy, since it prevents the efficient (ex-ante) screening of 
heterogeneous agents in the credit market. As a result, those agents who are not able to 
exploit their comparative advantages inflict a negative externality (through the adverse 
selection problem) on those who, in principle, would be able to fully exercise their intrinsic 
skills.
I model an economy constituted by a large number of potential sectors. Each sec­
tor represents a different industry or productive activity, and requires the application of 
some specific type of entrepreneurial skill. At a particular moment in time, only a frac­
tion among those potential sectors are available to agents (i.e., only a fraction of sectors 
actually exist). The appearance of new sectors is assumed to be the result of innovations; 
this reflects the idea that carrying out new industrial activities or producing new types 
of goods requires first an increase in the stock of knowledge in the society. The key 
point in this paper lies on the hypothesis that sectors variety facilitates the allocation 
of individuals’ talent. This fact reduces the severity of the adverse selection problem 
in the credit market, enabling the provision of more satisfactory credit contracts, which 
fosters entrepreneurial investment. The impact of sectoral variety on the credit market 
efficiency, in turn, gives rise to a novel positive feedback between financial development 
and innovation activities. Entrepreneurs are the agents who put innovations into practise 
in the economy. This means that the level of entrepreneurial investment is what ulti­
mately determines the size of the market for innovations. As a result, better operation 
of financial markets spurs the incentives to invest in R&D (by fostering entrepreneurial 
investment) and, at the same time, higher investment in R&D contributes to financial 
development (by expanding the number of sectors available in the economy).
From a dynamic perspective, the development path followed by a successful economy 
is characterised by a continuous process of capital differentiation (sectoral diversification). 
In addition to that, the allocation of talent improves and financial institutions become 
increasingly efficient, as adverse selection problems tend to vanish away concomitantly 
with sectoral diversification. Nevertheless, this model may also generate a peculiar type of 
poverty-trap. In this undesirable situation, economies exhibit a rudimentary productive 
structure, with few active industries, poor allocation of individuals’ talent, and highly 
inefficient financial institutions. In that sense, this poverty-trap is the result of a general
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organisational failure in the economy, leading to the collapse of several markets.
Historically, sectoral differentiation has been considered to increase productivity by 
either permitting the exploitation of economies of scale (e.g., Smith (1776), Young (1928), 
Yang and Borland (1991)) or enabling heterogeneous agents to obtain a better match 
(e.g., Rosen (1978), Miller (1984), Kim (1989)). The contribution of this paper is to show 
that sectoral horizontal expansion brings about an additional positive effect on growth, 
because a larger variety of activities helps to lessen adverse selection problems associated 
to the allocation of skills.
The possibility that credit markets efficiency might be influenced by agents’ payoffs 
in other markets of the economy has been suggested by De Meza and Webb (2000). Yet, 
in their model these payoffs are exogenously set. Ghatak, Morelli and Sjostrom (2006) 
follow this idea, but they explicitly endogenise agents’ payoffs, exploiting an interesting 
"two-way" interaction between the credit market and the labour market. In their model, 
when the economy is able to provide high wages, low-quality entrepreneurs find themselves 
better-off selling their labour in the market. As a result, high wages help to "clean" the 
pool of credit applicants, reducing informational frictions and enabling better operation 
of the credit market.
This paper differs from Ghatak et al in that it studies the sorting of talent within 
a multi-sectoral endogenous growth model. Innovation and the creation of new pro­
ductive activities become thus key features of the model, since they lead to improved 
sorting of skills to sectors. Two main novel findings result from my model compared to 
Ghatak et al. First, it shows that innovation improves the assignment of skills, which in 
turn feeds back on innovation by increasing the returns to R&D. Second, it highlights a 
new role for the innovation process, very different from the one traditionally stressed in 
the growth literature. Innovations are not only desirable because they directly augment 
the productivity of inputs. They are also desirable because they help to mitigate infor­
mational frictions hindering the operation of financial markets. From that perspective, 
this paper contributes to the literature on horizontal innovation and growth initiated 
by Romer (1990), proposing an additional channel whereby variety expansion promotes 
development.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) also build a theory in which agents’ intrinsic perfor­
mance improves during the process of development. However, they focus on how a society 
endeavours to provide correct incentives to agents, and why incentives become more effec­
tive as an economy grows. They do not study how the allocation of heterogeneous skills 
evolves during development. Furthermore, they do not incorporate innovation decisions 
into their theory, which precludes the variety of activities from expanding over time. In
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another paper, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) construct a model where the degree of 
market incompleteness tends to disappear with capital accumulation, and this leads to 
financial development (in particular, it improves risk-sharing). Nonetheless, neither this 
model deals with the issue of skills allocation and adverse selection. Financial markets 
are enhanced with sectoral differentiation, simply because this allows better pooling of 
sector-specific shocks. In contrast, in my model financial development is the consequence 
of the alleviation of informational failures due to improvements in the sorting of skills.
The present paper is also closely related to the literature about financial market 
imperfections and poverty -  e.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993, 1994), Galor and Zeira 
(1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyds-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), and 
Ghatak and Jiang (2002). These articles stress the influence of the wealth distribution 
on the dynamic behaviour of the economy when agency-costs lead to credit rationing. 
As a general result, their models commonly lead to poverty-traps when the number 
of poor agents is large enough. This paper contributes to this literature by different 
channels. It first provides a fully micro-founded explanation of why agency-costs may 
arise in a developing economy. Secondly, it is able to generate dynamics where these 
agency-costs go down as an economy develops. As a result, rationing is not just solved 
because people become rich enough (so that they can afford better credit or insurance 
contracts), but mainly because financial markets’ operation itself becomes more efficient 
along development.
Section 2 .1.1 presents some evidence about sectoral diversification along the path of 
development; this section could be skipped if the reader wants to proceed immediately 
to the model. Section 2.2 describes the basic set-up of the model. Section 2.3 studies the 
static equilibrium of the economy; in particular it analyses the entrepreneurs’ optimal 
choice in the presence of adverse selection. Section 2.4 introduces the innovation activities 
into the model, which endogenises the variety of sectors in the economy. Section 2.5 
proceeds to the dynamic study of this economy. Section 2.6 discusses some extensions to 
the basic model. Section 2.7 concludes. Appendix A presents some cross-country data 
consistent with the main predictions of the model. Omitted proofs are provided in the 
Appendix B.
2 .1 .1  S ectora l D iversification  and D evelop m en t in th e  D a ta
Sectoral diversification is a feature recurrently observed during the process of develop­
ment. Allyn Young (1928) writes "industrial differentiation has been and remains the 
type of change characteristically associated with the growth of production" (p. 537). 
Landes (1969) claims that the most evident effects brought about by the Industrial Rev­
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olution were both the gains in productivity and the increase in the variety of products 
and occupations (p. 5). In a passage of his book he writes "the whole tendency of in­
dustrialization and urbanization was to specialize labour ever farther and break down 
the versatility of the household", proceeding to enumerate a long list of new occupations 
(ranging from bakers, butchers, manufacturers of candles, soap and polish, to others like 
carpenters, masons, plumbers, and plasterers) which started to appear and expand with 
the Industrial Revolution (p. 119). Kubo et al (1986) show evidence that the share of 
intermediate goods substantially increased along with output per-capita for a sample of 
nine semi-industrialised countries in the post-war period.1 This suggests that industry 
differentiation took place in conjunction with growth in those economies.
Econometric evidence also gives support to the premise that sectoral diversification is 
experienced over the path of development. For a panel of 67 countries, Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) show that sectoral concentration (the opposite of sectoral diversification) drasti­
cally falls at early stages of development, following a "U-shape" relation with respect 
to income per-head.2 They conclude that, during development, economies initially ex­
perience a long process of sectoral diversification which eventually reaches a maximum 
beyond where the process begins to revert. Given the implications of my paper, two ob­
servations need to be stressed here: (i) the "turning-point" in the diversification process 
tends to occur at relatively high income per-capita levels (the authors argue that this 
point is located roughly at the income per-head reached by Ireland in 1992); (ii) the even­
tual re-concentration process does only partly offset the effect of the initial diversification 
phase - see figures 1, 2 and 3 in their paper, p. 69.
F i g u r e  2.1 provides an overview of the association between sectoral diversification 
and income per-head found by Imbs and Wacziarg. Sectoral concentration is measured 
by the Imbs and Wacziarg’s Gini coefficients for employment shares based on the UNIDO 
3-digit dataset (a smaller Gini coefficient would thus reflect a more diversified economy 
in terms of manufacturing industries) .3 Income per-head is measured by GDP per-capita
'These countries are: Norway, Israel, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico, and Colom­
bia.
2 Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use the non-parametric technique lowess ( locally weighted scatterplot 
smoothing) to capture the association between sectoral concentration and income per-capita. They build 
five different concentration indices based on employment shares (Gini coefficient, Herfindahl index, log- 
variance of sector shares, coefficient of variation, and the max-min spread). These indices are constructed 
for three different datasets: 1-digit level (9 sectors) from the International Labor Office (ILO), 3-digit 
level (28 sectors) from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), and 2-digit 
level (20 sectors) from the OECD. For the UNIDO and OECD datasets, value-added per sector is also 
available and utilised. All their results are robust to the use of different indices and datasets.
31 am indebted to Jean Imbs for kindly providing me with this data.
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in thousands of PPP  1985 constant US dollars (from Summers and Heston (1991)). To 
allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic relation between sectoral concentration and 
GDP per-capita, I run a fifth-order polynomial regression. I also show in F i g u r e  2.1 
the results of a quadratic regression on the GDP per-head. Both regressions additionally 
control for country fixed-effects.4 We can observe the pattern described in Imbs and 
Wacziarg: sectoral concentration initially decreases with income per-capita, eventually 
reaching a turning-point beyond which the relation partially reverts.
’ A*
Income per-head
Gini (UNIDO 3-digit dataset) — — — — Quadratic regression (incl. fixed-effects)
■ 5th order polynomial (incl fixed-effects)
F i g u r e  2.1: Sectoral Concentration and Income Per-Head.
The Gini coefficient in the picture measures the degree of sectoral concentration in the econom y in terms 
of em ploym ent shares across 28 manufacturing sectors (3-digit level disaggregation, UNIDO dataset).
This paper will focus strictly on the initial stages of development, where sectoral 
diversification and income per-head increase together. The eventual re-specialisation 
pattern may presumably be partly explained by the joint effect of increasing returns to 
scale (both static and dynamic) and regional specialisation; a phenomenon which will 
be completely neglected in my theory. Despite this omission, in Section 2.6 and Section 
2.7, I discuss a possible extension to my benchmark model that could make my theory 
still consistent with the non-monotonic relation between income per-head and sectoral 
diversification displayed in F I G U R E  2.1.
4 Country fixed-effects are very im portant at determ ining the productive structure of economies. Since 
in this paper we are following individual economies over their own path of developm ent, it is then strictly 
necessary to  control for fixed-effects to obtain a consistent picture of th is process.
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2.2 E n vironm ent
The paper considers a small economy enjoying full access to international credit markets. 
Life evolves over a discrete-time infinite horizon t =  { 0 , 1 , oo}. In each period t a 
single-period lived continuum of agents with mass normalised to 2 is alive.
The economy contains a continuum of sectors indexed by the letter i € [0,1]. Each 
sector i represents a particular industry in the economy (nevertheless, for analytical 
simplicity, I will assume that in each sector i the same single final good is actually 
produced). The set of sectors [0,1] is constant over time; however, not all sectors are 
necessarily active at any moment in time. In particular, I suppose that at time t only 
a fraction nt of all sectors are able to enjoy the activity of productive industries. At 
the same time, the remaining fraction (1 — nt ) lacks of any active industry whatsoever. 
Hereafter, At C [0,1] will denote the set of sectors with active industries at time t. The 
set At has Lesbegue measure nt .
The availability of productive industries is the result of innovations (either generated 
during the past or in the present). This assumption reflects the idea that in order to 
produce a new type of good, we first need to create the knowledge required to produce 
this new good. Once the industrial activity that corresponds to sector i is created by an 
innovation, it never disappears (i.e., if sector i € At, then sector i G At+s V<5 > 0 ). To 
ease notation, henceforth I skip the use of time-subscripts when creating no confusion. 
Sectors belonging to A  will be referred to as active sectors (and the remaining sectors 
will accordingly be called inactive sectors).
A sector i £ A  provides the agents in the economy the chance to invest in an en­
trepreneurial project called Project-*. The return of Project-* is random, subject to an 
idiosyncratic shock. Project-*’s return also depends on the application of some specific 
entrepreneurial skills, and on the amount of capital (k ) invested in the project. A full 
description of Project-* is provided in the following subsection (equations (2.1) and (2.2) 
ahead in the text).
Each generation-^ of agents comprises two different groups of individuals, each one 
with mass equal to 1; namely:
1. Entrepreneurs: These agents are endowed with entrepreneurial skills which are 
needed to organise and undertake the production of final goods.
2. Inventors: They carry out R&D in order to generate new ideas that can be used 
by the entrepreneurs in the production of new final goods.5
5 To illustrate this distinction, take the Pharmaceutical Industry as an example. The innovator would 
be represented by a biochemist whose task consists in designing a formula to produce a new drug. On
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2.2 .1  E n tre p r e n e u r s
At any time t, there exists a continuum of (prospective) entrepreneurs who are indexed 
by the letter i £ [0,1]. The index i denotes the entrepreneur’s type. The entrepreneur i 
will be referred to as the Type-i.
The cohort-t of entrepreneurs is alive during period t. A new cohort is born just 
at the end of the previous cohort’s lifespan. Each (dying) entrepreneur procreates one 
(new) entrepreneur. For the moment, I assume agents are non-altruistic and are born 
with zero initial wealth (in Section 2.6 this assumption is relaxed).
All entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, sharing identical preferences over the single con­
sumption good. Accordingly, they all seek to maximise their expected consumption. The 
ex-post level of consumption will be determined by their ex-post investment net returns. 
Since entrepreneurs are born with zero initial wealth, the only way in which they can 
provide themselves with future consumption is by borrowing capital from credit mar­
kets and investing it in an entrepreneurial project. Diversification among entrepreneurial 
projects is not feasible; in other words, these agents must specialise in one particular 
project.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial skills. More 
precisely, if a Type-j £ [0,1] invests k units of capital in Project-i £ A, then his Project- 
Vs gross return (yij) is given by:
The function f ( k ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, 
and satisfies Inada conditions. The variable kij  represents the amount of capital invested 
in Project-i by the Type-j. Capital fully depreciates during the process of production. 
Finally, 6ij denotes the realisation of a random-variable with support {0,1}. The value 
taken by is governed by the following distribution function:
the other hand, the pharmaceutical company would represent the entrepreneur. This agent organises the
1 with probability p ij
0 with probability 1 — p i j .
Where,
Pij =  1 for all i , j  £ [0,1] if j  =  i,
Pi,j =  P G (0,1) for all i , j  £ [0,1] if j  A  *•
production process of the drug and takes it to the market, turning the (abstract) formula into a final 
good ready for consum ption.
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In short, a Type-i is an agent with intrinsic comparative advantage in Project-i.6 Gross 
returns of Project-i are thus given by:
Ui,i — ( 2 . 1)
f{ki, j) with probability p
0 with probability 1 — p
where j  ^  i (2 -2)
Concerning the informational structure in the economy, types are private informa­
tion. In other words, there is asymmetric information regarding entrepreneurial skills. 
In addition to that, I assume types are intergenerationally uncorrelated, implying that 
parents’ historical outcomes provide no information whatsoever about the type of a child.
Lastly, I assume that everybody has access to a "backyard" activity which requires 
no initial investment and yields net return equal to v with certainty. Without any loss 
of generality, I set v =  0 (implying that the activities participation constraint will never 
bind) .7
2.2 .2  Inventors
In addition to the set of entrepreneurs, in any period t there is also a continuum of agents 
with mass 1 (the inventors) who are born with the particular skill to be able to produce 
new ideas. New ideas, in turn, materialise in innovations and thus expand set of active 
sectors available in the economy in period t (i.e., the set At). This means that, in any 
period t , the set At is the result of the stock of innovations generated during the set of 
periods {0 , 1, ...£}; that is, during the history of the economy up to t.
The presentation of the inventors’ optimisation problem will be postponed until Sec­
tion 2.4. For the time being (in Section 2.3) the exposition of model can be perfectly 
carried out without its explicit incorporation.
2.2 .3  C red it M arkets
Since agents in the economy are born with zero wealth, they will need to rely on credit
markets in order to undertake their investment projects. The rest of the world will provide
local agents with the needed liquidity. All credit market transactions with the rest of
the world are mediated by some firms called financial intermediaries. The credit market
6 The concept of comparative advantage is defined in terms of average productivity (the average pro­
ductivity of Type-z in Project-z is higher than the average productivity of T ype-j ^  i in Project-z).
7If v >  0, agents would have access to an outside option with positive payoff, hence their participation 
constraint may bind in equilibrium. This might have some minor implications on the type of credit 
contracts observed in equilibrium, however, none the main results and insights of the paper would be 
altered by letting v >  0.
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is characterised by free-entry and absence of set-up or sunk costs. Since the economy is 
small and there is perfect international capital mobility, financial intermediaries are able 
to draw liquid funds from international credit markets facing a perfectly elastic supply 
at the international (net) interest rate R ? . For algebraic simplicity, I set R f = 0.
Financial intermediaries offer credit contracts stipulating fixed interest rates (i.e., 
interest rates that are not contingent upon ex-post output). When the borrower cannot 
pay back the amount agreed in the credit contract, he goes bankrupt and loses all rights 
on his final output, which goes entirely to the financial intermediary. These contracts 
are standard loan contracts (Gale and Hellwig [1985]). A credit contract offered to an 
entrepreneur can thus be specified as a pair (l j , r j ) G l x M ;  where lj represents the loan 
extended to the Type-ji and rj stands for the (net) interest rate charged on the loan lj. 
Individuals are protected by limited-liability, meaning that their consumption cannot fall 
below a lower-bound which I set equal to zero. As a result, lj(l  + rj) will be (in principle) 
paid back to financial intermediaries only in the event of success. On the other hand, 
when the project fails, the entrepreneur goes bankrupt and the financial intermediary 
recovers 0 income.
2.3 S ta tic  E quilibrium  A n alysis
Throughout this section the set of active sectors At  is taken as exogenously given. Thus, 
the paper focuses on the entrepreneurs’ optimal behaviour, and on the set of credit 
contracts offered by financial intermediaries, given At- This course of action will yield 
the equilibrium solution of the model at some specific period of time t. In the next 
sections I proceed to study the dynamic evolution of the economy. This will require 
explicitly incorporating the inventors’ optimisation problem, which endogenises the set
At-
Let Q c i x E  denote the set of all feasible credit contracts (I, r ), and Ct C Q  denote 
the subset of feasible credit contracts offered by financial intermediaries in period t. An 
entrepreneur j  G [0,1] alive during t will choose an allocation [{rj,lj)*,k*j : i G At], 
solving the following two-stage optimisation problem:
• F irs t-S tag e  (specialisation decision): j  G [0,1] selects sector i G At  in which 
to invest.
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• Second-Stage (optim al investm ent in sector i):8
max : Ei{Uj) =  P i j  max (0, f { h j )  -  (1 +  rj)lj +  {lj -  kid)}
+ (i -  pij)  max {0, -(1  +  rj)lj +  {lj -  k{j )} (I)
subject to: kij  < lj (budget constraint),
h j  > 0 (feasibility constraint),
{r j , l j ) G Ct (set of offered credit contracts).
Definition 1 (Equilibrium at tim e t ) Given the set A t, an equilibrium at time t € 
I f f  is a set of entrepreneurial allocations [{rj, lj)*, kf- : i G *4f]je[o,i] and a se  ^ °f  °ffered 
entrepreneurial credit contracts Ct, such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1) E n trep ren eu rs’ op tim al allocation: Given the set Ct, Vj G [0,1] alive in period t, 
the allocation \{vj,lj)*,kl- : i G At] solves the two-stage optimisation problem (I).
2) Credit m arkets (com petitive) equilibrium: (i) No credit contract belonging to Ct
makes negative expected profits; and (ii) there exists no other credit contract 3 G O, such
that 3 ^ Ct , and which, if  offered in addition to Ct, would make positive expected profits.
2.3 .1  C red it M arket E quilibrium  C on tracts
Following the literature on adverse selection in financial markets (e.g. Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), and Milde and Riley (1988)), one would reasonably expect 
two different kinds of equilibria to possibly arise in this model’s credit market: 1) a 
pooling equilibrium, in which all types receive an identical credit contracts; 2 ) a separating 
equilibrium, in which types are screened, receiving distinctive contracts which induce 
truthful self-revelation of their (unobservable) skills.
Proposition 1 Assume the set of inactive sectors at time t is non-empty {i.e. A t A  [0j1])- 
Take any sector i G At and any sector j  At- Then, there can never exist an equilibrium 
at t in which the Type-i and the Type-j are offered different credit contracts.
Proposition 1 implies there cannot exist a separating equilibrium in this model. As a 
consequence, if an equilibrium is to exist at all, it should entail pooling credit contracts. 
The result in Proposition 1 stems from the conjunction of five different assumptions: 1) 
agents displaying risk-neutrality, 2) the particular form of the production functions in 
(2.1) and (2.2), 3) the limited-liability constraint, 4) agents being born with zero initial 
wealth (so they have no collateral), and 5) the outside option yields v = 0. Intuitively,
8Ei(Uj)  denotes the expected utility of Type-j when he invests in Project-i (recall that the success 
probability p i j  depends on the match between the type and the sector).
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given a set of credit contracts, any contract that maximises net returns for (2 .1) must 
also necessarily maximise expected net returns for (2 .2) (since, in the presence of limited- 
liability and no collateral, expected net returns when (2 .2) holds are proportional to net 
returns when (2 .1) prevails).9
Given the set of active sectors at time t, At C  [0,1], we may split the population 
of entrepreneurs alive during t in two disjoint subsets. Firstly, we may gather all those 
entrepreneurs of type-i € [0,1], such that sector i G At- Secondly, we may bunch together 
all those entrepreneurs of type-j G [0,1], such that sector j  £ At- The first group of agents 
would be able to fully exploit their comparative skills, whereas the second one have to 
specialise in a sector for which they are not (exceptionally) talented. Abusing a bit of 
the language utilised in the adverse selection literature, I will call the first group the 
good-types, while the second group will be denoted as the bad-types.10
In a pooling equilibrium, all entrepreneurs receive an identical credit contract (l ,r ). 
Notice then that Ct must comprise one single element; namely Ct = Additionally,
in any (competitive) pooling equilibrium, credit contracts must necessarily verify the 
following two properties. First, the contract must make non-negative expected profits; 
otherwise this contract would simply be withdrawn. Second, the contract must maximise 
the expected utility of the good-types; otherwise financial intermediaries could offer a 
different contract such that it makes non-negative profits and, at the same time, it makes 
these agents better-off.11
Assume for the moment that the Type-i chooses to specialise in sector i E A  (as 
it will become clear later on, this will necessarily be true in equilibrium). Then, given 
Ct =  (l ,r ), his optimisation problem boils down to:
max : max {0 , /(&»,*) -  (1 +  r)l +  (/ -  ki}i)} (I’)
s.t : ki,i < I (budget constraint).
9 See Ghatak, Morelli and Sjostrom (2006), and also Griiner (2003), for models that obtain pooling 
contracts in a similar fashion.
10More rigorously: good-typest — { h e  [0,1] | sector h E A t }  and bad-typest — { h e  [0,1] | sector 
h £ A t} -  Notice that in this paper whether a particular Type-/i e  [0,1] is a good-type or a bad-type is 
not fixed, but it is contingent on the set At-  In that sense, from a dynamic point of view, everyone could 
eventually become a good-type, if the set of active sectors constantly expands over time.
11 It must be also clear that Ct =  {l , r) E M + X R + . Although nothing precludes the fact that / could
be in principle negative (i.e., entrepreneurs could lend capital to financial intermediaries), this possibility
will never arise in equilibrium, as entrepreneurs are born with zero initial wealth. In addition to that, 
in equilibrium, financial intermediaries would never offer loan contracts with r  <  0, as these contracts 
would entail (expected) losses.
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Note now that entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries only to invest in an 
entrepreneurial project. As a consequence, credit contracts offered in equilibrium must 
necessarily satisfy the condition f '(l) > 1 (because no entrepreneur would ever invest in 
his project beyond the point in which the marginal productivity of capital falls below 1, 
since the net interest on deposits equals R f  =  0). The budget constraint for the Type-z 
will thus bind; in other words, kij  =  I will hold in the optimum. Problem (I’) will then 
yield the following (standard) first-order condition:
/'(*♦) =  ( 1 + r )  (2.3)
From (2.3), we can then obtain the optimal amount of capital invested in the project, 
given the interest rate r. That is, fc*(r); where k'(r) < 0 since /"(■) < 0. An equilibrium 
pooling contract will, therefore, display the following structure: (l,r) =  (k*(r),r). (So 
that it maximises the expected utility of the good-types.)
2 .3 .2  T h e E q uilibrium  In terest R a te  (on  E ntrepreneuria l Loans)
The pair (k*(r),r) characterises the equilibrium credit contract, given the interest rate 
r. Therefore, in order to determine the exact credit contract that holds in period t , it 
still remains to find the equilibrium value of r in t. Let us denote this variable by rf. 
Perfect competition in the credit market naturally implies that financial intermediaries 
must make zero profits in equilibrium; hence r% will be pinned down by the respective 
zero-profit condition.
Consider sector i € At and sector j  £ At. Take the Type-z alive in t, and imagine he 
decides to invest in Project-z. Then, given r, his consumption (c;^) would be determined 
by:
Ci,i = f(k*(r))  -  (1 +  r)k*(r). (2.4)
Now, imagine this Type-z chooses to invest in Project-x £ At,  where x ^  z. In that 
case, his consumption (cXj;) would amount cx^ — p[f(k*(r)) — (1 +  r)k*(r)] . From these 
two expressions, it becomes straightforward that > cX)j, no matter the value of r. 
Therefore, as long as sector i £ At,  the Type-z (alive in t) will specialise in Project-z.
Take now the type-j entrepreneur alive during t. This agent could invest in Project-z 
(or in any Project-x, such that sector x £ At),  obtaining as expected consumption (cjj):
°i,j = P lf{k*(r)) - ( 1 +  r)k*(r)]. (2.5)
Notice that because f (k )  satisfies Inada conditions (in particular, because limfc-,0  f ( k )  = 
oo) the expression in (2.5) yields > 0, irrespective of the value taken by r. This means
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it will always be desirable for the Type-.? to invest k*(r) in Project-i (or in Project-x 
indifferently).
From the previous discussion, we can then deduce that a fraction nt of the population 
of entrepreneurs (the good-types) will always pay back the financial intermediaries the 
agreed amount (1 +  r)k*(r). On the other hand, the remaining fraction 1 — nt (the bad- 
types) will go bankrupt with probability 1 — p. Being protected by limited-liability, the 
bad-types are expected to pay back financiers only the amount p{ 1 +  r)k*(r). Then, the 
zero-profit condition reads thus as follows: nt (1 -F rf)k*(rf) -f- (1 — n*)p(l +  r%)k*(rf) —  
(1 4- Rf)k*{rl)  (where, recall that for algebraic simplicity, R? — 0 will be assumed).
Proposition 2 The equilibrium interest rate charged on credit contracts offered to en­
trepreneurs is a decreasing function of the fraction of active sectors. More precisely,
=  (2 .6)
nt + (1 — nt)p
From (2.6), it can also be noted that: r*(0) =  (1 — p)/p,  r*(l) =  0, and r"(nt) > 0.
Proposition 2 reflects one the most important insights of this paper. A larger number 
of active sectors leads to a more efficient operation of credit markets; this is the case 
because a higher value of nt improves the sorting of entrepreneurial skills, alleviating 
the adverse selection problem in the credit market. Intuitively, as the set At expands, a 
higher fraction of agents find it feasible to specialise in the sector they are most talented 
at. This fact reduces the average default rate in the economy, enabling financiers to 
charge a lower interest rate on the loans they extend to entrepreneurs, without incurring 
in expected losses.12
2.3 .3  E ntrepreneuria l C on su m p tion  L evel /  N e t R etu rn s
Take again some Type-i 6  [0,1], such that sector i G A  (a good-type representative). His 
consumption level will be dictated by (2.4). Denote by Ug{r) the utility level achieved 
by an entrepreneur who belongs to the subset of good-types. Differentiating (2.4) with 
respect to r, and taking (2.3) into account, we get:
U'g(r) = -k*(r).  (2.7)
Select now some Type-j € [0,1], such that sector j  ^ A  (a bad-types representative). 
His expected consumption will be given by (2.5). Hence, letting Ub(r) denote the level 
of expected utility reached by a bad-type, we obtain:
U'h{r) = -pk*{r) ,  (2 .8 )
12The reader might actually prefer to call r* the risk-premium. In that sense, it is the risk-premium 
on entrepreneurial loans what diminishes as n goes up due to the better sorting of talent.
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where derivation of (2.8) also makes use of (2.3).
Lem m a 1 Let A(r) = Ug{r) -  Ub(r). Then, A(r) > 0 and A '(r) < 0, for all possible 
values r may take in equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward from inspection of (2.7) and (2.8). The 
derivative A '(r) < 0 means that good-types benefit from a fall in the interest rate r more 
than bad-types do. The reason for this result lies on the fact that good-types never go 
bankrupt, thus they will appropriate the full cost-reduction induced by a lower r. On the 
other hand, since bad-types go bankrupt with probability (1 — p), they will profit from 
a smaller r only with probability p < 1. Lemma 1 will play a key role in the inventors’ 
optimisation problem (next section).
So far, the set At has been taken as exogenously determined. In this way, the model 
has managed to characterise the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium choices in some specific period 
t. In order to endogenise the set At and study the dynamics of this model, the inventors’ 
behaviour needs to be explicitly incorporated. I proceed now to do so.
2.4  Inventors, M arket for Ideas, and Innovations
I model the appearance of new active sectors as the result of innovations. Following 
the Endogenous Growth Theory paradigm ,13 innovations result from deliberate profit- 
maximising R&D policies undertaken by private agents which I refer to as inventors. I 
will focus only on horizontal innovations, as those are the kind of innovations that will 
lead to improvements in the allocation of agents’ talent; the key mechanism at work in 
this paper.
In each period t there is a continuum of single-period lived inventors with mass 1. 
Inventors are able to generate new ideas (this is their specific skill) -  think of an idea 
as a blueprint or design, which contains the information needed to produce new types 
of goods. Like previously done with sectors and entrepreneurs, let inventors be indexed 
by i € [0,1]. Inventors are also assumed non-altruistic and risk-neutral. Each (dying) 
inventor gives birth to a (new) inventor. Except for their particular index i, all inventors 
within the same cohort are ex-ante identical. I suppose the inventor i can only possibly 
innovate for sector i. Since vertical innovations are assumed away, the subset of inventors 
who (would) innovate for sectors which were already active in period t — 1 will thus not 
play any relevant role during t.
In order to come up with a new idea, an inventor needs first to carry out R&D, which 
is costly. A new idea, however, does not per-se modify the technological frontier of the
13E.g. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992).
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economy; for that to happen, the idea must by applied by an entrepreneur. In other 
words, there is a strong intrinsic complementarity between inventors and entrepreneurs, 
and this requires both agents’ specific skills to be implemented for the technological 
frontier of the economy to expand.14 When the idea designed by inventor i is put into 
practise by some entrepreneur j  G [0,1], this idea becomes technology, and materialises 
as Project-i (turning sector i into an active sector). Technology is a pure public-good; 
that is, its use is non-rival and non-excludable. More precisely, once some particular 
entrepreneur j  G [0,1] applies a new idea, the underlying knowledge becomes readily 
(and instantly) available to all the other entrepreneurs from t onwards. On the contrary, 
an idea is excludable, since the inventor who has generated it can keep his idea undisclosed 
as long as he wants, simply by not spelling it out to any other agent.
An inventor who comes up with a new idea, will then try to sell it to an entrepre­
neur. I assume entrepreneurs pay the inventors after production takes place and that the 
transaction between an inventor and an entrepreneur is not observed by the financiers. 
Given the public nature of technology, only the Type-i would be willing to pay a positive 
price to obtain the idea generated by inventor i. To see this, recall from Lemma 1 that 
A(r) > 0 for any possible value that r may take in equilibrium. This A(r) equals the 
increment in (expected) utility that the Type-i would get by applying the idea generated 
by inventor i (were this idea given to him for free!). Notice A(r) is a surplus resulting 
from a bilateral-monopoly relation between the Type-i and the inventor i. In principle, 
the surplus A(r) could be distributed between the two parties according to various dif­
ferent rules. For simplicity, I will assume that the whole surplus A(r) is appropriated 
by the inventor, leaving the entrepreneur just indifferent between buying or not the new 
idea (in other words, the inventor makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the entrepreneur for 
the transfer of the idea) .15
14This is in line with the view of economic development by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934); he writes 
"Entrepreneurship must be distinguished from ’invention’. As long as they are not carried out into practice, 
inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement into effect is a task entirely different 
from the inventing of it, and requiring different kinds of aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may  
be inventors, it would not be by nature of their function but by coincidence. ", pp. 88-89. Relatedly, 
Hobsbawm (1977) claims it was not scientific supremacy what explains why the Industrial Revolution 
occurred first in UK; in fact, he asserts that both France and Germany were notably above UK in terms 
of scientific knowledge at that time (pp. 29-30).
1 N on eth eless, as long as it is assumed that the inventor’s income is increasing in the total surplus A (r), 
none of the main findings of this paper would be affected if the entrepreneur could actually appropriate 
part of A (r) (for instance, if the surplus were split following a Nash-bargaining rule).
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2.4 .1  In ven tors’ O p tim isa tion  P rob lem
Suppose inventors must expend effort in order to generate new ideas. Effort generates 
disutility. Let L^ t denote the effort-cost (measured in units of consumption-good) spent in 
R&D activities by the inventor i alive during period t. Additionally, denote by Pr(7; =  1) 
the probability that the inventor i will generate a new idea. Consider sector i £ A t - 1; 
the probability that inventor i generates an idea for sector i in period t is given by 
(henceforth, I skip the use of time subscripts on to ease notation):
Pr(/i = 1) = /?(*), (2.9)
where: (3'(t) > 0, (3"(l) < 0, /3(0) =  0, lim (3(l) < 1, and lim/3'(t) is finite.L—►OO L—>0
Since sector i A t - 1, the inventor i alive in period t would (in principle) be able to 
generate a new idea. This inventor will thus choose the value of Li so as to maximise his 
expected profits function derived from the generation and sale of new ideas.16 Denote 
by I t the level of R&D effort chosen by all the inventors belonging to the subset —A f f l , 
where —A f f 1 =  { j  E [0,1] | j  A * and sector j  £ A t - i} .17 Having managed to produce 
a new idea, inventor i would optimally charge a price A(r*(nt)) when selling this idea 
to the Type-i. Notice that, assuming that all new ideas are sold to entrepreneurs (which 
will be true in equilibrium), nt = n t- i  + /3(lt)(l — n t_ i) .18 Hence, we can rewrite 
A (r*(nt)) =  ^ (n t- i ,  It). Lemma 2 characterises the optimisation problem faced by 
inventor i.
Lem m a 2 Consider sector i ^ A t- \ ,  and take the inventor i alive during t. He solves: 
m ax: n»t(ti, nt- i ,  I t)  =  /?(t») • ^ ( n t- i ,  1t ) -  Li (II)
L i >  0
Where the function \I/(n t_ i,It) : [0,1] x K+ —» K+ is increasing in both of its arguments. 
More precisely: (i) ^ ( - )  > 0,Vnt-i € [0,1] and I t  > 0; and (ii.a) ^ -(-) > 0,Vnt_i £ 
[0 , 1) and I t  > 0 , (ii.b) (•) =  0 if  n t - 1 =  1 .
From Lemma 2 it follows that n ^ ( t j ,  nt_i, I t)  must be increasing in both n t- \  and It. 
To grasp some intuition, notice that, since active sectors do not ever revert to inactive, 
the higher nt-1  is, the higher nt is expected to be. As a result, relatively high values of
I6If sector i €  then the inventor i alive in t trivially chooses n  =  0.
I7This ~Lt should actually be a mapping It : — —> [0,oo), summarising the choice of i for each
inventor belonging to — However, in the optimum, all these inventors will select the same value of 
i. Hence, a singleton ~tt turns out to be sufficient to represent their aggregate behaviour.
18 This is because: 1) the sectors that were already active in t — 1 remain active in t, and 2) a fraction 
/3(It) among the inactive sectors in t — 1 become active in t.
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Tit—i will tend to be associated with relatively low levels of r* in t (Proposition 2). This, 
in turn, implies that the surplus generated by new innovations, A(r*), is expected to 
be large (Lemma 1), allowing inventors to charge a relatively high price for their ideas. 
Similarly, larger values of Tt are also associated with less severe adverse selection leading 
to lower r* and higher A(r*). In this case, the reason for this positive effect is that a 
larger Tt means more innovations will actually be produced, raising thus the value of nt 
(from the given nt-\) .  In addition to that, note ^ ( - )  > 0 implies that there exists a 
positive externality across inventors. This externality arises because when an inventor 
j  G [0 , 1] comes up with a new idea, this may turn sector j  into an active sector, increasing 
the value of nt (something which all inventors will benefit from).
Problem (II) leads to the following first-order condition:
1 and t* [/3'(t*) • *(«*_!, Tt ) -  l] =  0 (2.10)
Proposition 3 Let t* = argmax nt- i ,  it)} . Then, t* =  l*(nt-i, it) : [0,1] x
R+ —> R+, and it exhibits the following two properties: 1) L*(nt- \ ,T t)  is (weakly) in­
creasing in n t - 1 ; 2) t*(n*_i,Tt) is (weakly) increasing in Tt.
Results in Proposition 3 are straightforward implications of Lemma 2 and (2.10). In­
tuitively, as <911 itt{-)/dti is increasing in both nt- \  and Tt , larger values of either variables 
will induce inventors to increase the optimal amount of effort spent in R&D.
The positive impact of nt_i on l\ represents the main result of this section. This 
feature is the underlying force generating the novel positive feedback between financial 
development and innovation activities proposed in this paper. Essentially, a larger nt- \  
is associated with weaker distortions in the credit market, thereby leading to higher 
entrepreneurial investment which raises profit to inventors. This induces higher R&D 
effort which, in turn, leads to a faster rate of innovations, feeding back on nt . This 
positive feedback gives rise to the possibility of non-ergodic dynamics in the model, as it 
will be discussed in detail in Section 2.5.
For the remainder of the paper, it proves convenient to restrict the parameters con­
figuration such that the following two conditions hold:
A ssum ption  1. 3 h e  (0,1), such that: /3'(0) \£(n, 0) =  1 .
A ssum ption  2 . 3 n  6  (0,1), such that: 0'(O) [lim-^.^ ^ (n , 7)] =  1 .
C oro llary  1 I f  Assumption 1 holds, then: (i) Vn*_i < h : if Tt =  0 !* =  0 ; (ii)
Vnt_i > n : i* > 0, regardless of the value taken by Tt .
C orollary  2 I f  Assumption 2 holds, then: \/nt- 1 < n : l* = 0, regardless of the value 
taken by Tt. (Notice Lemma 2 implies n < n.)
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F i g u r e  2.2 provides a visual description of the results stated in Proposition 3. The 
left panel plots l* against nt-  1, given four different values of Tt (these values are: 0 < 
~Lq < Ta < oo). Analogously, the right panel plots i* against Zt , given five different 
values of nt- \  (na < ub < h < nc  < 1)- Notice that the notation in both panels is 
consistent with each other (i.e., the value m  in panel (a) corresponds to the value T a in 
panel (b), and so on and so forth). Additionally, in F i g u r e  2.2 .b (although not plotted) 
for n t -1  — n we should have t*(nt- 1, Tt) =  0 for all values of Tt- (The 45° line is just 
plotted for future reference.)
I ( ^ - 15^ /)  ^ ( fy -p O
MAXI
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f = 0
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F i g u r e  2.2: Optimal R&D effort as a function of nt-1  and tt- 
2.4 .2  Inventors N ash  E quilibrium  S olu tion
F i g u r e  2.2 characterises the result of the optimisation problem faced by inventor i alive 
in period t when sector i £ A t - 1, given nt~i and the (expected) behaviour of the rest 
of the inventors. Nevertheless, I haven’t yet discussed whether inventors’ expectations, 
summarised by Tt , are indeed correct. In fact, expectations play an important role in the 
model because R&D effort by a particular inventor exerts a positive externality on the 
others. More specifically, as stated in Proposition 3, the optimal policy of an inventor 
positively depends the value of I t . As a result, we must restrict the attention only to 
those solutions of Problem (II) which also represent a Nash Equilibrium (NE) when we 
consider the whole set of inventors.
Given the structure of the model, any NE will be symmetric (SNE) - see Vives 
(2005), p. 441. The SNE are determined by the intersections between the 45° line and 
the curves plotted in F i g u r e  2 .b. For some ranges of nt- i  G ( n ,  1 ) ,  the model might lead
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to multiple SNE.19 Equilibrium multiplicity may arise because inventors are subject to 
strategic complementarities (Cooper and John (1988)). FIGURE 2.3 shows two possible 
SNE schedules as a function of nt- \  (only the SNE schedule for an inventor i alive in 
t such that sector i A t - 1 is plotted). In F i g u r e  2.2 .(b) and 2.3.(b) the parameters 
configuration leads always (i.e., for all values of n t - 1) to unique SNE.20 On the other 
hand, in FIGURE 2.3.(a) multiple equilibria emerge for values of nt-1  G (n,n) - two 
equilibria are possible in this case; one where qT =  0 , and another one in which L*t > 0 . 
Bear in mind that, as it can be deduced from Corollary 2, for any nt~i < n , the SNE 
must necessarily be unique and encompass =  0. Furthermore, for values of nt-1  
sufficiently close to 1, the SNE must also necessarily be unique (since limn_>i \Er'_ =  0); 
but comprising > 0 (because 0 < n < 1).
,MAX,MAXi
(a)
FIGURE 2.3: Inventors’ Symmetric Nash Equilibrium.
Remark. Since the optimal R&D effort is a function of the bilateral-surplus, A(r^), which 
has been assumed to be fully appropriated by the inventor, all the previous results of this 
section in terms of l* =  t*(n*_i, 1 1 ) will remain unchanged if inventor i and entrepreneur 
i were in fact the same agent. All that is needed in that case is to reinterpret Li t as the 
R&D effort-cost by entrepreneur i alive in period t.
2.5 A ggregate  D yn am ic A n alysis
The analysis in Section 2.3 has been conducted within a static framework (the set At 
was taken as given). Section 2.4 provides the bridge between the static and the dynamic
19 In what follows I restrict the analysis only to stable SNE though.
20 A sufficient condition for uniqueness of SNE is that: »)»('T~) <  b  G [0> 1] and I  > 0. 
Generally speaking, uniqueness requires innovators’ external effects not to be too strong, so that the 
curves plotted on FIG U R E  2.2.6 do not ever cross the 45° line from below -  see Cooper and John (1988).
28
analysis of the economy, since the inventors’ behaviour determines the evolution of the 
set At which, in turn, dictates the exact equilibrium that holds at any time t according 
to Definition 1. In this section, I present the dynamics of At- Since agents are born with 
zero initial wealth and all sectors are (ex-ante) symmetric, nt turns out to be the only 
variable whose behaviour we need study in order to keep track of the dynamics of the 
economy.
Definition 2 (Dynam ic Equilibrium) A dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of static 
equilibria, linked together across time by the "law of motion" of nt specified in (2.11).
Law o f  M otion: n t = n t- \  + P(it)(l -  nt-i); (2 -11)
where if represents the R&D effort by inventor h e [0,1] alive in period t when sector 
h £ A t - i ,  resulting from the SNE described in Section 2.4-2. More precisely, V/i A t- \  '• 
f  solves Problem (II), given the function Y*: [0 ,1 ]^  —► that summarises i*kt
for all k ^  h € [0 , 1] in period t.
2.5 .1  S tagn ation  vs. D evelop m en t (m u ltip le  d yn am ic equilibria)
This subsection investigates the characteristics of the dynamic paths followed by economies 
that differ in terms of their initial conditions. In particular, it studies whether economies 
that differ in terms of no may follow divergent dynamic paths, reaching different long- 
run equilibria. For this reason, I impose here the following condition on the parameters 
configuration (so that the inventors’ SNE will always be unique, leading to a situation 
as the one in F i g u r e  2 . 3 . b).
Assum ption 3 (sufficient condition for uniqueness of SNE).
e t  = h  for a11"  € [(U1 and z -  °-
Proposition 4 (Stagnation vs. Developm ent) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. 
Then:
(i) Any economy that starts off with no < n remains forever at no and displays no 
innovation activities. That is, if  no < n, then: n t = no for all t > 0, while l* = 0 for all 
t > 0 .
(ii) In any economy in which no > n, nt will continuously grow over time, converging 
monotonically to noo =  1 .
Secular Stagnation: Take an economy for which no < n. Then, for this economy, the 
equilibrium in t =  1 encompasses l\ =  0. In addition to zero R&D effort and absence of
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innovation, this economy will exhibit highly inefficient credit provision and low levels of 
entrepreneurial investment. The credit market inefficiency is the consequence of severe 
adverse selection problems, which derive from the high degree of sector incompleteness. 
On the other hand, repressed entrepreneurship is the result of both lack of opportunities 
(few active sectors) and inadequate credit provision.
From (2.11), since =  0, then n\ =  uq. This implies that i\ — 0 will hold again at 
t = 2, in turn leading to ri2 =  n\ — uq. Furthermore, in the absence of any substantial 
exogenous shock, this stagnant equilibrium will perpetuate itself for a li i  £ {0 , 1, ...oo}.
Prosperity and Development: Consider now an economy in which uq is large enough; 
more specifically, no > n. In this case, the equilibrium at t — 1 displays i\ > 0. Intu­
itively, since n is relatively large, the adverse selection problem associated to the alloca­
tion of talent does not become too serious, and the operation of the economy does not 
turn out to be severely distorted (in particular, innovation activities do not completely 
disappear).
From (2.11), > 0 implies that some additional sectors become active during t — 1.
As a result, n\  > no > n, and i\ > t\ > 0. Moreover, this prosperous dynamics will 
perpetuate ad infinitum, and this economy will eventually reach a long-run equilibrium 
characterised by complete sectors (n ^  =  1). During the transition period, the economy 
experiences development and growth; this manifests itself as a continuous process of sec­
toral horizontal expansion (capital differentiation) and better sorting of entrepreneurial 
skills. At the same time, financial market operation concomitantly improves, as adverse 
selection problems tend to vanish as nt rises.
2.5 .2  H istory  vs. E x p ecta tio n s (m u ltip le  s ta tic  equilibria)
Section 2.4.2 has shown that, within the range of n t~i £ (n , 1), for some set of parameters 
configurations the model might display multiple SNE in the inventors game. As a partic­
ular example, in F i g u r e  2.3.a, for n t - 1 £ [n ,n ], where h £ (n, n), we find two possible 
(stable) SNE. Multiplicity of the inventors’ SNE will lead to multiplicity of static equi­
libria in this model. It is beyond the scope of this paper to study this sort of equilibrium 
multiplicity, as the main intention here is to analise how dynamic paths may depend on 
the initial conditions. Nevertheless, I provide below a brief discussion of the equilibrium 
characteristics of an economy whose parameters configuration leads to a situation as the 
one depicted in F i g u r e  2.3.a.
When parameters in the model lead to a situation as the one plotted in F i g u r e  2.3 .a, 
then if the value of no £ [n,n], this economy will be subject to multiple static equilib­
ria. Equilibrium multiplicity will be driven by inventors’ expectations. In particular, if
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expectations coordinate in Zi =  0, then — 0 will prevail. Besides this "bad" equilib­
rium, we can observe that there also exists some specific value l \  > 0 , which would lead 
to a "better" equilibrium comprising l \  — z \  > 0. More importantly, from a dynamic 
perspective, whether expectations in t = 1 lead to i\ =  0 or i\ > 0 may carry dramatic 
future consequences. Dynamically, i\ — 0 entails that nt stays stagnant during period 
t = 1; as a result, initial conditions in t =  2 would identically replicate those faced in 
t = 1, with the economy still at risk of suffering from coordination failures. On the other 
hand, t\ > 0 means that n\ > no and, consequently, this could possibly shoot up n\ 
above n, and ignite a process of continuous prosperity and development thereafter. For 
an economy with n*_1 £ [n,n], the larger nt- 1 is, the higher the chances that nt > n will 
hold if i* > 0. Hence, within [n,n], both history and expectations matter in the sense of 
Krugman (1991), and the economy might display periods of growth and technical change, 
followed by periods of stagnation.
2.6 In corp oratin g  W ealth  into th e  M od el
So far it has been supposed that all individuals are born with zero initial wealth. In 
many aspects this assumption might seem far too extreme. Nevertheless, the zero initial 
wealth assumption has allowed the model to completely isolate the impact of the fraction 
of active sectors on the operation of the economy. In this section, I let agents be born with 
positive initial wealth; furthermore, I allow initial wealth to differ across individuals of the 
same cohort. In particular, this section features individuals who are warm-glow altruistic 
and, accordingly, bequeath a fraction of their net life-time income to their offspring (this 
bequest will constitute the next generation’s initial wealth) -  see Andreoni (1989). In 
short, this section shows that none of the main results and insights presented in this 
paper will be altered when we permit agents’ initial wealth to be positive, stemming 
from parental bequests.
Let wij  denote the initial wealth of the Type-i alive in period t. Initial-wealth is 
assumed publicly observable, and is distributed in the population of entrepreneurs ac­
cording to the cumulative distribution function flt(w).21 Since types are assumed to be 
intergenerationally uncorrelated, then, in a steady state, initial wealth and types will 
turn out to be uncorrelated as well (accordingly, the specific value of wi t will provide no 
information about the i ’s type).
21 The presence of positive initial wealth will only affect the equilibrium in the economy through its 
effect on the entrepreneurs. Accordingly, without any loss of generality, we can restrict the attention here 
only to the initial wealth distribution among the population of entrepreneurs.
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2 .6 .1  T h e  P artic ip a tion  C onstrain t
When initial wealth is positive we need to take care of the participation constraint (PC) 
in the credit market. In particular, when w > 0 a bad-type might prefer not to engage 
in any credit market transaction, and behave as if he were in complete autarky, since he 
may now invest a positive amount of capital (k < w) in a project, without the need to 
borrow.
Suppose a bad-type with initial wealth w must choose his portfolio allocation in 
autarky. In such case, he will solve:
max : p f(k )  + (w — k).
0 <k< w
This optimisation problem yields the following investment policies:
k* — w if w < kB ,
k* — k*B if w > k*B.
Where f'(k*B) =  p~l (i.e., k*B is the first-best investment level of bad-types).
Imagine now that this bad-type decides to participate in the credit market. In this 
case, he will invest k*p (r) units of capital in the project, paying an interest rate r on 
the borrowed amount (k*p (r) — w)\ where r corresponds to the interest rate that would 
hold in a pooling equilibrium. The function kp (r) stems form the first-order condition 
f'(k*p ) =  1 +  r; analogous to (2.3) in the main model. Notice that 1 +  r < p~l , hence 
kp(r) > kB . A bad-type will participate in the credit market only if his PC  is not 
violated; this requires that: p[ f(k p (r)) — (1 +  r)(k*p (r) — u>)] > p f (k B) + (w — kB), for 
w > kB 22 From this condition, it follows that a bad-type will participate in the credit 
market if and only if his initial wealth does not surpass the threshold w(r) € (kB, kp (r)); 
that is, if and only if w < w(r), where
G(r)  =  p  W p W  ~ M b ) -  +  kB
1 -  p( 1 -I- r)
2 .6 .2  T h e Incentive C om p atib ility  C onstrain t
Take an entrepreneur whose w > w(r). If he is a good-type, he must get a separating
credit contract (paying an interest rate equal to R f  =  0 ), as no bad-type with w > w(r)
desires to participate in the credit market at the interest rate r. Despite that, a good-
type with w > w(r) will not necessarily obtain a first-best credit contract. For this
to happen, an equally rich bad-type should find no incentives to imitate the good-type
22The participation constraint also requires that: p[f(k% (r))  — (1 +  r ) (k p (r )  — u>)] >  p f (w ) ,  for all 
w <k*B. Nevertheless, this last condition never binds.
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first-best behaviour. Denote with kG the result deriving from the first-order condition 
f ( k G) — 1; i.e., kG designates the first-best entrepreneurial investment level of the good- 
types. Notice that kG > k*p (r), since 1 + r  > 1. A good-type will thus receive a first-best 
credit contract if and only if: p[f(kG) — (kG — w)] < p f (k p ) 4- (w — kp ). This last
condition requires that his initial wealth is larger than the threshold w G (w(r), kG)\ that
is, it calls for w > w, where
~ _  P [f (kG) — f  (kp ) — kG] +  k*B 
1 - p
What happens to a good-type whose w G [w(r),w]l This agent will certainly receive 
a separating contract. However, he won’t be able to get a first-best contract, as this 
would violate the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC ) of the bad-types with identical 
w. In fact, the IC  will bind for those entrepreneurs whose w G [w(r),w ]. As a result, the 
credit contract received by a good-type with w G [w(r),w] derives from:
V [ f m  -  (k*s -  w)] =  P f(k*B) + (*>- kh)- (2.12)
Equation (2.12) (implicitly) yields a function kg(w); which displays the following prop­
erties: (z) dkg/dw = (f'{kg) — I ) -1  > 0 , (ii) d2kg/(dw )2 > 0 , and (Hi) l i r n ^ ^
kg(w) = kG. T a b l e  2.A summarises the main features displayed by the credit contracts 
offered to entrepreneurs.23
T a b l e  2.A: Equilibrium Contracts (main features)
w < w(r) w G [w(r),w ] w > w
type of credit contract pooling sub-optimal separating first-best separating
investment by good-types k*p (r) k*s (w) kG
interest rate (on credit) 0 < r <  i f 0 0
2.6 .3  E ntrepreneurial C on su m p tion  and Sketch  o f  D yn am ics
As in Section 2.3.3, denote by Ug (Ub) the expected utility level achieved by a good- 
type (bad-type). When initial wealth is incorporated into the model, it will naturally 
be the case that (expected) utility will depend on w as well -  i.e., Ug =  Ug(r,w) and 
Ub = Ub(r,w). T a b l e  2.B summarises how entrepreneurial expected utility depends on 
w (and r).
23 The underlying reason why richer agents receive more favourable credit contracts is the same as in 
the papers on financial markets imperfections and poverty cited in the Introduction. Namely, since richer 
agents have more of their own wealth at stake in the projects, their incentives are more closely aligned 
to those of lenders.
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T a b l e  2.B: Entrepreneurial Consumption -  Ug(r,w) and Ub{r,w).
w < w(r) w E [w(r), w] w > w
good-types
bad-types
f{k*P{r)) -  (1 +  r){k*p (r) -  w )
P[f(k *p(r )) - i 1 +  r )(kp (r ) ~ 'w)]
f ( k*s{w)) ~{k*s {w) - w ) 
P f ikB) H w -  kB)
f(kh )  ~ (kQ — w)
Pf(k*B) + ( w -  k*B)
From the results presented in T a b l e  2.B, this lemma follows, (a formal proof of this 
lemma is available from the author upon request).
Lem m a 3 Let A (r,w) = Ug(r,w) — Ub{r,w). Then: (i) A(-) > 0, Vu;,r > 0; (ii) 
A'r(-) < 0, Vr > 0 and w E [0,tc(r)]; (Hi) a) A'w(-) > 0, Vu; E [0,u>) and r > 0; b) 
^w(-) =  0 , Vw > w.
Lemma 3 represents the counterpart of Lemma 1, when entrepreneurs start their 
lives with positive wealth. On the one hand, Lemma 3 shows that Lemma l ’s key result 
A'r(-) < 0 holds as well when w > 0. On the other hand, it shows that the gap A(-) is 
(weakly) increasing in w, which implies that richer entrepreneurs benefit from a larger nt 
more than poorer entrepreneurs do. Furthermore, recall that the larger A(-) is, the higher 
the incentives for inventors to undertake R&D -  Lemma 2 and Proposition 3. Therefore,
*) ^  0 entails that, for a given value of n^ which, following Proposition 2, tvill 
determine r*(nt)~, the aggregate distortions generated by the adverse selection problem 
in the credit market will become less severe the wealthier the economy is. FIGURE 2.4 
plots the gap A(r, w) against w at four different values of r  (namely: l /p  > > tl > 0),
as a visual description of results in Lemma 3.24
From a dynamic perspective, notice finally that economies exhibiting a larger nt tend 
to be richer as well. This is the case because the larger the fraction of active sectors, the 
higher the average productivity in the economy. As a result, introducing wealth dynamics 
into the model (by means of bequests, or any other reason that would still generate
positive serial correlation in wt) will not invalidate any of the main findings of this paper.
In fact, as nt and wealth affect the economy’s performance in the same direction, the 
presence of bequests will actually reinforce the dynamics previously discussed in Section 
2.5.
24Recall r  =  p  1 when n =  0, and r  =  0 when n =  1. Additionally, notice w '(r ) <  0, where
lim w (r)  — k*B and limuifr1) =  w.
r— — l r—>0
34
A(r.n’)
0
F ig u re  2.4: A(r,w)  against w at four different levels of r.
2 .6 .4  D yn am ics w ith  P o sitiv e  B eq u ests
Suppose preferences are given by U^t =  c\~t6^iv  where Ci,t denotes the consumption of 
agent i alive in t, bijt represents the bequest left to his offspring, and 5 € (0 ,1). Given 
those preferences, individuals will optimally bequeath a fraction 5 of their lifetime income 
to their offspring. The amount b{jt will in turn fully determine the initial wealth of Vs 
son; i.e., Wij+i =  Henceforth, we split the population of entrepreneurs in lineages 
indexed by the letter i G [0,1]. Since types are intergenerationally uncorrelated, the 
initial wealth transition equations for any lineage i of entrepreneurs are given by:
,  s [f(k*p(rt)) ~ (! + rt)(k*P(rt) ~ wi,t)] with Pr =  nt + p(l -  nt)
Wi,t+1 =  < if w n  < w (rt)
0 with Pr =  (1 — p)(l — nt)
5 [f(kg(wift)) -  k*s {wit) +  Witt] with Pr =  nt
Wijt+i =   ^ S [f(kg) -  k*B + wijt] with Pr =  p( 1 -  nt) if u>*,t € [w{rt),w\
5 [wijt -  k*B\ with Pr =  (1 -  p )(l -  nt)
6 [f(kb) ~ kG +  wi,t\ with Pr =  nt
Wi,t+1 =   ^ <5 [f(kB) -  kB +  Wij] with Pr - p( 1 -  nt) if wijt > w
8 [wij -  kB] with Pr =  (1 -  p)(l -  nt)
When w is linked across generations by bequests, the dynamics of the economy can 
no longer be solely determined by the value of nt but also depend on the initial wealth 
distribution In particular, the economy’s dynamic path is now dictated by the
following system:
nt =  nt- i  + -  nt- i )  (2.13)
= rt[fi*(io)]. (2.14)
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Where:
arg max
Remark. For this section we continue assuming that the NE of the inventors’ game 
is always unique (or, alternatively, that coordination failures, even if possible, do not 
arise). Accordingly, from (2.15), we can write C[ =  L%(nt-i,flt(w)), as the function that 
pins down the optimal it , given nt- \  and the initial wealth distribution flt(w). (Recall, 
once again, that nt~i determines nt which in turn determines rt ; hence we can write rt 
as a function of n*_1).
The operator Tt [•] maps the initial wealth distribution prevailing in period t into the 
initial wealth distribution holding in t -1- 1, based on the transition equations specified 
above. Notice that this operator changes over time, since the transition equations and 
their associated occurrence probabilities both depend on the value of nt . Additionally, 
the dynamic behaviour of nt is affected by Qt(w) through (2.15). These two features of 
the dynamic system described by (2.13) and (2.14) make it non-stationary and highly 
complicated to study. Some interesting general results are however not difficult to prove.
L em m a 4 (i) Consider two different initial wealth distributions Qt(w) and Q!t (w), and 
suppose Qt(w) first-order stochastically dominates fl't (w) -  henceforth denoted as flt{w) >z 
Q,'t (w). Then: i^(nt-i,Clt(w)) > L*{nt-i,Cl't{w)).
(ii) Consider two economies (A and B) with identical initial wealth distribution, i.e. 
Clf(w) — f l f (w )  =  Qt(w)- Suppose also that n f  > n f . Then: f2^(.1(u;) >: Q,^ +l(w).
Lemma 4 (i) states that, all other things equal, wealthier economies tend to spend 
more in R&D, and its underlying intuition is straightforward from Lemma 3.25 On the 
other hand, Lemma 4 (ii) says that economies with a larger fraction of active sectors tend 
to be richer too. The reason for this result lies in two combined effects: first, a higher 
nt means that more agents are able to find a sector in which they have a comparative 
advantage, increasing the average productivity in the economy; second, a higher nt leads 
to the provision of better credit contracts, spurring entrepreneurial investment. Lemma 4 
thus formally proves that introducing wealth dynamics into the model (through bequests 
motives) reinforces the dynamics that have been described before in Section 2.5.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, where we should now interpret (n t-1, 11) =  
A(r£(n t~i, i^), 0), and let 0,$ (Qq) denote the degenerate distribution function in which
25Notice that given the shape of A (r ,w)  as plotted in FIGURE 2.4, we cannot say much about the 
effect of higher moments of Qt(u;) on t*. In particular, since A (r ,w )  has initially a convex segment (with 
respect to w),  followed by a concave segment, the effect on i* of subjecting fit (w) to  a mean-preserving 
spread is ambiguous.
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Wi =  w (Wi — 0) for all i £ [0,1]. Then:
(i) I f  nt-1  > h, nt will converge monotonically to Hqo = 1 , regardless offlt(w).
(ii) Suppose Qt(w) =  £1#. Then, there exists n^  < n such that if nt- \  > n n t  will 
converge monotonically to n oo = 1
(Hi) Suppose fl0 X Slt (w) X 0,$. Then, G [n^,n] such that if  nt-1  > n ^ w ,^
nt will converge monotonically to n<*, =  1. Furthermore, consider Q,t(w) >: Q,'t (w), then 
nn(w) — v(w)’
Proposition 5 firstly shows that the main result in Proposition 4 still holds true when 
we incorporate standard wealth dynamics into the model -  when nt is sufficiently large, 
the economy embarks in a sustainable process of development, regardless of the wealth 
distribution in t. Secondly, it shows that initial wealth acts as a partial "substitute" 
for n*. This last result stems from the fact that both nt and wt contribute to alleviate 
adverse selection problems in the credit market. Notice that Proposition 5 (ii) and (Hi) 
imply that the minimum degree of sectoral variety needed to guarantee long-run growth 
is smaller the richer the economy is. This result can be interpreted as saying that the 
importance of sectoral diversification as a factor improving the operation of financial 
markets is relatively higher at initial stages of development, and tends to decrease as the 
economy develops and becomes wealthier.
2.7  C on clud ing  R em arks
This paper has proposed a theory in which financial markets efficiency is a key condition 
for growth and development. I have suggested that an expanding variety of activities 
available in the economy may account for a very important factor leading to financial 
development. In particular, this theory has stressed a side effect associated to the in­
novation process that had not been explored before, but which could exert significant 
impact on development. I have argued that innovation activities can lead to a reduction 
of frictions in financial markets and foster financial development, because by expand­
ing the variety of productive activities in the economy, they concomitantly facilitate the 
allocation of skills, alleviating adverse selection problems.
The core model that illustrates this theory has made use of several simplifying assump­
tions. One assumption that may seem particularly worrying is the fact that individuals 
are born with no initial wealth. In that regard, Section 2.6 has shown that none of the 
model’s main findings would be affected if we let agents be born with positive wealth. 
Despite not altering its main results, introducing wealth may carry some additional in­
teresting implications within a more general model. Imagine we gave room for increasing
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returns to scale and international trade. If sectoral diversification really matters as a 
mechanism to solve adverse selection only at early stages of development (as suggested 
by Section 2.6), then in the presence of increasing returns and trade, at some point in 
the development path economies might find it worthwhile to revert the diversification 
tendency and embark in some sort of re-specialisation process. This feature would be in 
fact consistent with the evidence found in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), providing a sound 
explanation for the non-monotonic relation between sectoral diversification and income 
per-head shown initially in F I G U R E  2.1.
Another feature of the model that deserves further discussion is the financial inter­
mediaries behaviour. In this model financiers respond "passively" to the environment. 
However, it can be argued that the financial system operation improves along develop­
ment not only because frictions are alleviated, but also because the screening capacity 
of the financiers gets better. The paper has abstracted from the latter mechanism. One 
remark concerning this omission is worth noting, though. The amount of screening effort 
is an endogenous choice, and will be certainly influenced by the cost of screening. This 
paper states that screening effort is eased by sectoral variety, as this allows heterogeneous 
agents to self-select better. Yet, this is not necessarily implying that richer economies 
should do less credit screening than poorer ones. In fact, as sectoral variety decreases 
the cost of screening, in some cases more screening effort could be the optimal response 
by lenders to the new environment, rather than simply deny credit so as to avoid the 
screening cost fully.
From a policy perspective, an important implication of this theory concerns poverty- 
alleviation programmes. Section 2.5 has shown that some economies might get stuck 
in a peculiar type of poverty-trap. This is the result of a "deep-rooted" organisational 
failure, affecting several markets at the same time. Underdevelopment is characterised 
by few sectors in which individuals can specialise, inefficient financial markets, and scant 
innovation activities. The market failure contaminating the operation of the economy 
stems from the incapacity of some individuals to find an activity for which they are 
comparatively talented. Most theories on poverty-traps imply that economies can be 
easily rescued from poverty by receiving a sufficiently large wealth transfer. Instead, 
my theory suggests that foreign-aid should presumably also include important transfers 
of technology and know-how, as standard wealth transfers alone might not suffice to 
suppress the adverse selection problem (at least in a reasonably short time frame).
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A p p en d ix  A: F inancia l D evelop m en t and Sectoral D iversifi­
ca tion  in th e  D a ta
TABLE A .l: Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable: Log(Cred/GDP) -1187 observations
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(Credit/GDP) -1.355 -1.277 1.202 -15.12 0.554
Log Income per-head 1.30 1.38 0.98 -1.24 3.00
Herfindahl Index 0.119 0.087 0.099 0.060 0.877
Dependent Variable: Log(SMVK /GDP) - 471 observations
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(SMKT/GDP) -2.198 -2.122 1.379 -7.13 0.339
Log Income per-head 1.70 1.78 0.81 -0.15 2.90
Herfindahl Index 0.092 0.079 0.056 0.060 0.450
Dependent Variable: Log(SMVT/GDP) -  517 observations
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(SMVT/GDP) -4.145 -3.809 2.092 -10.78 1.867
Log Income per-head 1.72 1.79 0.79 -0.21 2.90
Herfindahl Index 0.087 0.078 0.043 0.060 0.423
Note: Log income per-head equal to -1.24 corresponds to income per head 290 in 1985 PPP US dollars.
This is the income per head (in PPP) o f Ethiopia in 1967. Log income per-head equal to 2.90 corresponds tc 
income per head 18,095 in 1985 PPP US dollars. This is the income per head (in PPP) o f US in 1989.
TABLE A.2: Sectoral Diversification and Financial Development
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
Log(Credit/GDP) 
. ..-11) (2)
Log(SMK/GDP) 
(3) (4)
Log(SMVT/GDP) 
(5) (6)
Sectoral Concentration -0.813** -1.178*** -3.47** -4.25*** 5.83 -1.41
(Herfindahl) (-2.51) (-3.56) (-2.35) (-2.88) (1.47) (-0.32)
Log Income per-head (Y) 0.806*** 0.575*** 2.88*** 2.05*** 4.634*** 2.72***
(16.37) (8.27) (16.62) (6.87) (13.58) (4.15)
Y x Herfindahl 2.062*** 8.26*** 20.23***
(interaction term) (4.65) (3.42) (3.42)
R squared (within) 0.21 0.22 0.41 0.43 0.28 0.30
Obs. / Countries 1187/56 1187/56 471/39 471/39 517/40 517/40
Note: / -statistic in parentheses. All regressions include an intercept and country fixed-effects.
Regressions are run on an unbalanced panel o f countries during years 1975 - 92.
Log(Cred/GDP) is the logarithm of Total Private Credit to GDP. Log(SMK/GDP) is the log o f  Stock Market Capitalisation to GDP. 
Log(SMVT/GDP) is the log of Stock Market Value Traded to GDP.
Log Income per-head is the log o f GDP per-head in PPP in 1,000 o f 1985 US dollars from Summers and Heston (1991).
The Herfindahl coefficients are based on the UNIDO 3-digit employment dataset from Imbs and Wacziarg (2003)
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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One of the main predictions of the paper is the positive feedback between the level of 
sectoral diversification and the size of the financial system. This feedback implies that 
those two variables should display positive correlation in cross-country data. T a b l e  A.2 
presents some evidence of this correlation for an unbalanced panel of countries during 
1975-92 (T a b l e  A .l shows the summary statistics for the regressions in T a b l e  A.2). To 
quantify the level of financial development, I take three different indicators traditionally 
used in the literature of financial development and growth: 1) the logarithm of the ratio 
of private credit by financial institutions to GDP, Log(Credit/GDP); 2) the logarithm of 
the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP, Log(SMK/GDP); 3) the logarithm of the 
ratio of stock market value traded to GDP, Log(SMVT/GDP) .26 To measure the degree 
of sectoral concentration, I use the Herfindahl indices for the employment shares across 
the 28 manufacturing sectors in the UNIDO 3-digit dataset; this measure of sectoral 
concentration is also used in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), from which I take the data .27
In columns (1), (3) and (5) of T a b l e  A.2, the financial development indicators are 
regressed against the sectoral concentration index, after controlling for country fixed- 
effects and including GDP per-capita as an additional regressor. Country fixed-effects 
are included because the intention of the paper is to follow individual economies over 
their own path of development. On the other hand, including GDP per-head controls 
for the fact that financial indicators and sectoral diversification might be moving to­
gether just as consequence of income shocks affecting both variables simultaneously. The 
equations estimated in the odd columns in T a b l e  A .2 display thus the following struc­
ture: FDitt — a + f3Yitt +  7 #i,t +  Ci +  ui,t, where FD^t denotes the level of financial 
development of country i in year t, Y^t stands for logarithm of income per-head of % 
in t, Hitt is the Herfindahl for the sectoral employment-shares of i in t, Q is a country 
fixed-effect, and u^t  is an idiosyncratic shock. From columns (1) and (3) we can observe 
that the estimated 7  exhibits the expected sign and is also highly significant. According 
to those two regressions, sectoral diversification is positively and significantly correlated 
with financial development within each country over the years of the sample, even after 
controlling for the possibility of common income shocks. When the stock market value 
traded to GDP ratio is used as a proxy for financial development, the estimate turns out
26 All data on financial indicators is taken from Beck et al (1999). Refer to this paper for a detailed 
description of those indicators.
27The reason why I am using here the Herfindahl instead of the Gini to measure sectoral concentration 
is that the former displays more variability than the latter, so it permits a more precise estimation of 
the coefficients in TA BLE A .2. In particular, the coefficient associated to the interaction term  in TABLE  
A .2. cannot be precisely estimated if using the Gini, while this is not the case if using the Herfindahl. 
To have an idea of the problem, the correlation between (Y  x Gini) and Y  is 0.98, while the correlation 
between ( Y x Herfindahl) and Y  is 0.74.
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to be insignificant and displays the opposite sign. About this issue, credit to GDP and 
stock market capitalisation to GDP can be argued to be better proxies for the level of 
financial development than the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP, which seems 
more to account for the liquidity of the stock market rather than for the size of that 
market. In that regard, the supportive evidence in columns (1) and (3) is presumably 
more compelling than the ambiguous result in column (5).
Section 2.6 of this paper suggests that sectoral diversification should play a more 
important role in poorer economies compared to richer ones. In short, that section 
has shown that wealth-effects operate in the same direction as the variety of sectors. 
Therefore, given the variety of sectors, richer economies would tend to suffer from less 
severe adverse selection, displaying accordingly higher financial development. In order 
to test for the presence of this effect, regressions (2), (4) and (6 ) in T a b l e  A.2 include 
an interaction term between the log of GDP per-head (Y)  and the degree of sectoral 
concentration (Herfindahl). The estimated equations in the even columns are then: 
FD i t =  a T (3Yitt +  7 Hijt +  A[Yi>t x H^t\ +  C» + ui,t- As predicted by Section 2 .6 , all 
the estimated A have the expected positive sign, being also highly significant. Further­
more, in column (6), including the interaction term makes the coefficient associated to 
Hij become negative as predicted by the paper (although it still remains statistically 
insignificant).
A p p en d ix  B: P roofs
P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  1 . Take two different credit contracts (l*,r*) £ [0, oo) x [0, oo) 
and (l,r) £ [0,oo) x [0, oo) , such that f '{k  =  /*) > 1 and f '{k  = I) > l .28 Hence, 
in equilibrium, all the amount that is borrowed will be invested in the entrepreneurial
projects. Accordingly, let’s denote: k* =  I* and k — I. Assume that:
f(k*) -  (1 +  r*)k* > f(k )  -  (1 +  f )k  (P.1.1)
Then, from (P.1.1), if the Type-i decides to specialise in sector i £ A, he will prefer 
contract (k*,r*) to contract (k ,r ).
Take now the Type-j. Since sector j  ^ A , he will specialise (indifferently) in any 
sector h £ [0,1], such that sector h £ A. Given limited-liability, the Type-j will (weakly) 
prefer contract (k, f)  to contract (k*,r*), if and only if:
p[/(*0 “  (! +  ?)k] > P [f(k*) ~ (1 +  r*)/c*] (P-1.2)
28It must be straightforward to notice that entrepreneurs only borrow in order to finance entrepreneurial 
investment. Therefore, in equilibrium, they would never borrow beyond the point f ' (k )  — 1.
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But, since p > 0, (P.1.2) contradicts (P.1.1). Hence, it cannot be true that, while the 
Type-z prefers contract (k*,r*) to contract (k,r), the Type-j prefers (k , r ) to (k*,r*) 
instead. Finally, since (k,r) and (k*,r*) can be any credit contracts; whenever the 
Type-z prefers (k*,r*) to (k, r), then the Type-j also prefers (k*,r*) to (k,r), and no 
equilibrium can possibly encompass separating credit contracts among those two types.
■
P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  2. Differentiating (2.6) with respect to nt yields:
drl/dn t — -  (1 -  p) [nt +  (1 -  nt)p]~2 < 0 . ■
P ro o f of Lem m a 2. Assume that the inventor z G [0,1] alive in t expends t; 
units of effort. If he manages to generate a new idea, then from Lemma 1 it should 
be straightforward that he will optimally charge a price equal to A(r^) to transfer the 
idea (to the Type-z) - this is the maximum price the inventor z could charge, while the 
Type-z is still willing to buy the new idea. Making use of Proposition 2, we can write 
A (rt) = &(r*(nt)) =  A(n*), where A'(nt) =  A '(-)^ - > 0 (from Proposition 2 and 
Lemma 1). How is the value nt determined? Suppose all inventors belonging to — 
choose T1 - Since active sectors in t — 1 never revert to inactive in t, and recalling (2.9), 
then:
nt = n t -1  +  (1 -  nt-i)P{Tt) =  ®{nt- 1, Tt) (L.2.1)
Notice that, because f3(it) is bounded away from 1, (L.2.1) implies $  (•) is increas­
ing in both nt~i and Tt . Now, plugging <f> (•) from (L.2.1) into A(n*), we can rewrite
A (<fr(nt- i , I t ) )  =  4>(nt- \ , Tt). From where it follows that: (z) ^'n =  A'(n*) (l-/3(Tt))nt- i  > 
0; (zz) =  A '(nt ) (1 -  nt-i)(3'(Tt), which leads to vp' > 0 if nt- \  G [0,1) and =  0 if 
nt- 1 =  1.
Finally, noting that having exerted effort t*, inventor z will succeed in generating a 
new idea with probability /3(zj), we may write: Uiyt(ii, nt~\, Tt) — P(h ) ■ ^ ( n t- \ ,  Tt ) -  h ; 
which is the expression stipulated in Lemma 2. ■
P ro o f  of P roposition  3. Part 1). Consider two values of nt_i; no,ni G [0,1], such 
that no < n\. Denote: Lq = z*(no,7t) and i\ =  z*(ni,7t); where Tt > 0. Finally, suppose
Lq > l\. Thus, from (2.10), it follows that:
0 ;(ti)tf (ni, T«) < /^ /(to)^,(nO) ~^ t). (P.3.1)
Since, /3"(l )  < 0, when Lq >  tj, P ' ( l q )  <  (3' ( l \ )  must then hold. As a result, (P.3.1)
necessarily requires that: ^ (n 0 , I t ) > ^ (n i,!* ), which contradicts ^  > 0 for all
Tt > 0 proved in Lemma 2. Consequently, no < n\ =>■ Lq < t\.
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Remark. Notice that if Lq > 0, then, given that Lq < t \ , (2.10) leads to: P ' ( ^ ^ ( n i ,  Tt ) — 
/3/(io)'(l?(no,Tt). From where we obtain: i\ > Lq (since \k(ni,Tt) > \k(no,It), due to 
Lemma 2).
Part 2). Take two values of T; Ta, Tf, G M+, such that Ta > T^. Denote: 6* =  t*(nt- i, I a) 
and cl =  i*(nt-i ,Tb);  where n t- i  G [0,1]. Finally, suppose l* < 1%. Then, from (2.10), it 
follows that:
P M V i n t - u T a )  < ^ '( ^ ) ^ ( n ,_ 1, I 6). (P.3.2)
In addition to that, P"(i) < 0 implies that, if i* < t£, then P'(ta) > P’{Lb)- As a result> 
(P.3.2) necessarily requires: ^ ( n t- i , T a) < 4/(n*_i, I*,), which contradicts > 0 for all
n t G [0,1) (and 4^ =  0 when n* =  1), proved in Lemma 2. Therefore, Ta > t b ^  ba ^  L^ .
u
Remark. Notice that if > 0 and nt-1  G [0,1), then, bearing in mind that i-l < C  (2 .10) 
leads to: ^ ( ^ ^ ( n t - i ,  Tb) — P'(P^)^ (nt-i^T a). From where it follows: > l£ (because
\I/(77,£_i, 7a) > \k(n t - i , I b ), due to results in Lemma 2).
P ro o f of C orollary  1 . (i) Since, from Lemma 2, 1F(l(-) > 0, setting Tt =  0 we obtain:
/3/(0)^r(nf_1, 0) < /?'(0)tf(n,0) =  1, Vnt_i < n. (C.1.1)
Thus, given P"(l) < 0 and the conditions stated in (2.10), (C.1.1) entails that t* =  0 
must necessarily prevail for any value of nt-1  < n when Tt = 0 .
(ii) Since 4/^(-) > 0, it follows that:
^ (0 )^ K _ ! ,0 )  > P'(0) V(n,0) =  1, Vnt- !  > n. (C.1.2)
Therefore, given < 0, (C.1.2) implies that t\ > 0 must necessarily hold for any
n t- 1 > n  when Tt = 0, so that to comply with (2.10). Finally, since \J>' (•) > 0,
P'(Q)'S>(nt- i ,  Tt ) > P'(0)^ (nt- i , 0 )  > P'(Q) \k(n, 0) =  1, Vnt_i > n  and Tt > 0.
Hence, in order to comply with (2.10), l* > 0 must hold for all n t- \  > n  and Tt > 0. ■
P ro o f  of C orollary  2 . Since 'F'.(-) > 0, then: p'(0) ^ (n t_i, oo) > p'(0) ^ ( n t- i ,  Tt ), 
for all values of Tt > 0 and nt- \  G [0,1]. As a result, if /?'(0) 4>(n, oo) =  1, it must be the 
case that:
P'(t'i) ^ ( n t - i ,  Tt ) < P'(0) tyfot -i ,  oo) < 1, Vnt_i < n, and *.*, Tt > 0. (C.2.1)
Thus, given (2.10), from (C.2.1) it follows l* =  0 must hold for all n t- \  < n  and Tt > 0.
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P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  4. (i) Take an economy in which uq < n and focus on
the inventors game in which l\ =  0. On the other hand, Assumption 3 entails that this 
SNE is unique. Since /3(0) =  0, then (2.11) implies that n\ =  no < n. As a result, in 
t — 2 conditions for the inventors game remain identical as they were at t =  1; thus, 
— 0 represents again the unique SNE in t =  2. Repeating the same argument ad
infinitum, it follows that: nt = no Vt > 0 and l* — 0 Vt > 0.
(ii) Take an economy where uq > n and focus on t — 1 . Given Assumption 1, Corollary 
1 implies that ^(no,0) > 0 .  As a result, there must necessarily exist a SNE for the 
inventors game in t =  1 in which t\ > 0. Given Assumption 3, then this l\ > 0 represents 
the unique SNE. Since l\ > 0, from (2.11) it follows that n\ =  no + (3(l\)(1 — no); hence, 
ni > no- In particular, this leads to n\ > no > n. Proposition 3 then implies that 
L2 > iI > 0. As a result of this, n2 > n\. Repeating this argument ad infinitum, we can 
observe that: n < no < n\ < n<i < ... < noo- Furthermore, since /3(t*)(l — n t - 1) —> 0 as 
nt —> 1, and because /3(t*)(l — n*_i) is bounded away from zero for any nt-1  G [0 , 1) and
tt > 0 ; then it follows that limn* =  1 . ■
P ro o f  of Lem m a 4. (i) The expression in (2.15) yields the first-order condition:
- h ( w )
Since rt is a decreasing function of nt, and nt is an increasing function of n*_i for all 
n t -1  £ [0,1); restating A (rt ,w) =  A(n*_i,u;), (L.4.1) can be rewritten as:
where <9A/<9n*_i > 0 for all nt~\ € [0,1), and dA/dw  =  dA /dw  > 0 (Lemma 3). As a 
result, from (L.4.2) it follows that if Qt(w) >z flft (w), then: A(n*_i, w) dQt (w) >
f cl,t(w)A(nt-i,w)dQt('w), which in turn implies t* (n*_i, £lt (w)) > i*(n*_i,f2* (w))- ♦
(ii) We need to prove the following: for all w > 0, and for all nA,n B G [0,1], such that 
nA > nB : then, Vx > 0, P(iw, [0,a;] | nB) > P (iy , [0,x] | nA); where P(w,[0,x] | n) 
denotes the probability that when wt = w, then wt+\ G [0,ar], conditional on nt =  n.
Step 1: Suppose w G [0,w;(r)). Let y(nt ,wt) = 6 [f (k*p (rt)) -  (1 + rt)(k*p (rt) -  witt)]-, 
where the fact that r% =  r(nf) is taken into account when defining y(-). Notice that 
dyjdnt  > 0 and dy/dwt — (1+r*) > 0. Additionally, define the following index-function:
equilibrium t — 1. Given Assumption 1, Corollary 1 implies there must exist a SNE for
(L.4.1)
(L.4.2)
1 if y(n, w) < x 
0 otherwise
(L.4.3)
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Notice that, because dy/dn  > 0, then the following two properties hold: 1) Iy(nA>w)<x =  1
=*■ \ ( n B ,w )< x  — 1; 2 )  \ ( n B ,w )< x  =  0 =>■ \ ( n A ,w )< x  =  0- Hence, if I j/ (n S ,iy )< x  7^ \ ( n A ,w )< x i
it must be the case that ly(nB w)<x =  1 while Iy(nAfW)<x — 0. Using (L.4.3), thus:
P (w,  [0,x] | nB) -  P (w,  [0,®] | n A) =  [(1 -  p)nB + p] \ ( n B,w)<x (L.4.4)
-  [(1 -  p) nA +  p] ly{nA>w)<x +  (1 -  p){nA -  nB).
Hence, if Iy(n^)U,)<x =  0, the right-hand side in (L.4.4) yields a strictly positive number. 
Alternatively, if =  1, then the right-hand side of (L.4.4) equals zero. Therefore,
P (w,  [0, x] | n B) > P ([w, [0, x] | nA) for all w  G [0, w(r)).
Step 2: Suppose w > w(r).  First, note that either if d [ f ( k B(w )) — kB(w) +  w\ < x 
when w  G [w(r),w],  or if 5 [/(&£.) -  fc£(tu) + w ]  < x  when w > w\  then in both cases:
P (w,  [0,x] | nB) =  P  (w , [0, rc] | nA) =  1. Second, when the opposite results hold, three 
different cases may arise:
Case 1: <5 (w — kB) > x.  Then, P (w,  [0, x] \ nB) — P (w,  [0, x] \ nA) =  0.
Case 2: 6 [ f(kB) -  kB + w] > x and 5 (w -  k*B) < x. Now, P (w, [0,a:] | n) — ( l - p ) ( l - n ) ;
thus: P (w, [0, x] | nB) — P (w, [0, x] \ nA) =  (1 — p)(nA — nB) > 0 .
Case 3: S [ f (kB) — k*B +w\ < x  and S (w — kB) < x. Now, P  (w , [0, x \ \ n )  =  (1 — n);
hence: P  (w , [0, x\ \ nB) — P  (w , [0, x] | nA) =  (nA — nB) > 0.
Therefore, as a result of all these four possible cases, we can deduce that: P  (w , [0, x] | n B) >
P  (w , [0, a?] | n^) for all w > w ( r )) as well. ■
P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  5. (i) Let 0  denote the set of all feasible distribution functions
Q,(w).  Suppose f l t iw) = ^ o -  Since n*_1 > n,  then > 0. Furthermore, since £lt(w) >z 
for any flt(w) G 0 , then from Lemma 4 (i ) it follows that: l* > 0 for any Qt(w) G 0. 
Therefore, nt > nt-1  > n, implying, in turn, that > 0 for any fit+i(tu) G 0. 
Repeating the same argument ad infinitum, the claimed result obtains. ♦
(ii) When n t - 1 =  n, we have that ^(0 )A (f, 0) =  1; where f  =  r*(n).  Thus, t*(n, Q,q) =  0. 
Furthermore, from (2.15) notice that <.£(n,flg) is the solution to:
A(r*(nt ) ,w)  = 1, where nt = n  + (1 -  n) fi(i^(n,  ft#)) (P.5.1)
From Lemma 3, and the fact that r*(n*) > f, it follows that A (r*(nt),w) > A (f ,0). 
Therefore, to comply with (P.5.1), t£(n, f1%) > 0 must hold. As a result, there must exist 
fifi < fi, such that ^(Ag, fig) > 0 and n =  n^  +  (1 — n^) P(i%(fifi, f^ ) ) ;  from which it 
follows that if nt-1  > n$ when Vlt(w) — fI then nt will grow over time, converging 
monotonically to n oo =  1- ♦
(Hi) From Lemma 3 (i), it follows that: Lt(n,Clt(w)) > 0 and i%(fifi,Q,t(w )) < Lt(nyj,Q,^).
As a result, there must exist n ^ w  ^ G [n^,n], such that t*(™fi(™)’^M ^)) — ® an<^  ^ =
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nn(w) +  (! ~ n n{w)) 0 [^t(ttn(u>)i^t(w))]; from which it follows that if nt_i > nn w^) when 
Q,t{w) holds, then nt will grow over time, converging monotonically to = 1. Finally, 
applying Lemma 3 (i ) again Lt{n&(w)i Qt(w)) > ^ (n p ^ ) , Q't (w)) obtains, from where 
^9.{w) < ™W(w) ^  Qt(w) h  flt(w) immediately follows. ■
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Chapter 3
A dverse Selection and Entrepreneurship in a 
M odel o f D evelopm ent
3.1 In trod u ction
Since the seminal papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977), the conse­
quences of adverse selection on the operation of insurance markets have been widely ac­
knowledged and understood. However, no serious attempts have been yet taken to apply 
the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson framework to the theory entrepreneurship, risk-taking and 
development. This omission by the development literature seems surprising for two main 
reasons. First, the literature that has so far explored the effects of imperfect risk-sharing 
on development has always relied on the presence of exogenous fixed costs [Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992)] or technological non-convexities limiting 
the scope for diversification in poor economies [Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)]. Thus, a 
fully micro-founded theory of the emergence and evolution of insurance market imperfec­
tions along the path of development is still missing. Second, informational asymmetries 
have long been recognised a serious impediment to development because they restrict the 
access to credit markets to the poor.1 Yet, despite the contractual similarities between 
credit and insurance, not much effort has been spent on formally linking informational 
asymmetries and the efficiency of risk-sharing markets within a theory of development.2
^ .g . ,  Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty 
(1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Berhardt (2000), Ghatak and Jiang (2002), and Mookherjee and Ray (2002).
2 There is a small literature that has studied entrepreneurial decisions under imperfect risk-sharing due 
to a moral hazard problem related to effort unobservability [Banerjee and Newman (1991) and Newman 
(2007)]. Those papers have led to results that are at odds with the reality, namely: the poor become 
entrepreneurs and bear the entrepreneurial uninsurable risks, while the rich choose to work as employees, 
remaining then fully insured by receiving a fixed wage. This seems another important reason why to 
explore the im plications of alternative sources of asymmetric information (such as adverse selection) for 
risk-sharing efficiency and development.
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This paper tackles the issues raised above by introducing informational asymmetries 
concerning entrepreneurial skills into an overlapping-generations model of development 
driven by entrepreneurial choice. A successful process of development requires the agents 
best suited for undertaking entrepreneurial activities to fully exercise their skills. How­
ever, because entrepreneurial skills are private information, an adverse selection problem 
endogenously arises when the prospective entrepreneurs intend to diversify away their 
idiosyncratic risks. The adverse selection problem prevents the provision of first-best 
insurance contracts against entrepreneurial risks, which may in turn depress the amount 
of entrepreneurial investment and slow down growth.
In order to isolate the effects brought about by the insurance market imperfection, we 
let all agents enjoy perfect access to the credit market. In the model, the old generation 
may undertake entrepreneurial projects that are subject to idiosyncratic risks. The young 
generation supplies labour, which is used as an input by the entrepreneurs. Imperfect 
insurance provision discourages entrepreneurial investment and, thus, diminishes labour 
demand, pushing down wages which represent the income of the young. Individuals’ 
preferences in the model display decreasing absolute risk aversion, hence the poorer the 
agents are, the more strongly risk-taking is deterred by the presence of uninsured risk.3 
As a result, if the old generation is poor, entrepreneurial investment will be low, and 
this will be carried over to the next generation by the low wages prevailing in the labour 
market. This feedback between entrepreneurial investment and wages implies that income 
displays persistence across generations. Furthermore, when risk aversion is sufficiently 
responsive to income and the entrepreneurial projects are sufficiently risky, the feedback 
between investment and wages becomes so strong that it may lead to the appearance of 
multiple long-run equilibria.
Empirical evidence in Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994) indicates that risk-sharing 
is an important concern in poor economies and that those economies have in fact man­
aged to prevent consumption swings due to idiosyncratic risks quite efficiently. Yet, it 
seems to be the case that low-income countries fulfil a large portion of their insurance 
needs by means of rather informal arrangements.4 This contrasts sharply with the case 
of developed economies in which most of risk-sharing is managed by formal institutions
3 The model makes use of a utility function that actually displays a stronger property than decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA), namely: decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). It can be easily proved 
that DRRA implies DARA. In the end of Section 3.4, I discuss the consequences of using instead a utility 
function with DARA, but without DRRA.
4E.g., sharecropping policies (Bardhan 1977), intra-family transfers (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and 
Rosenzweig (1988)), or buying and selling durable productive assets as a mean to provide self-insurance 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)).
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established with that purpose (e.g., stock markets, credit institutions, insurance com­
panies, options and future markets, welfare states). This paper will explicitly focus on 
the latter set of institutions, since those seem to be the relevant types of social arrange­
ments for supporting entrepreneurial activities and long-run growth. Informal schemes 
have proven relatively efficient at preventing consumption drops, mainly due to intrinsic 
weather and health risks within poorer agricultural economies. However, the activities 
that spur long-run growth and ignite the process of modernisation to a manufacturing 
econo»my imply taking on additional entrepreneurial risks, and as such they need to be 
supported by institutions deliberately devised to share those risks. In that regard, the 
adver se selection problem presented in this paper only arises when an economy intends to 
switclh from an agricultural village economy to a modern industrial economy. The reason 
is thaJ skills heterogeneity becomes an important issue to deal with only when there is a 
large manufacturing sector.5
Lastly, from a policy perspective, disentangling the underpinnings of insurance versus 
credit market imperfections appears also as a relevant issue for investigation because some 
of their implications are in conflict (Banerjee, 2000). For example, if insurance markets 
imperfections are viewed as a serious hindrance to long-run growth, an immediate policy 
recommendation would be to increase the protection to the poor when bad states of 
nature realise, in order to enhance their willingness to take on risky entrepreneurial 
activi ties. However, credit constraints typically arise because, in the presence of limited 
liability, the poor have literally "nothing to lose" and, thus, cannot truthfully commit to 
repay their debt or to exert optimal effort. As a result, if access to credit is the main 
concerrn, strengthening the protection to the poor in the bad states of nature may be a 
wrong policy to follow, as it would further aggravate their incentives problem.
Tlte rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the set up of the 
modeL Section 3.3 characterises the static equilibrium under imperfect risk-sharing due 
to thae adverse selection problem. Section 3.4 analyses the dynamics of the economy, 
specifying the conditions under which multiple long-run equilibria may coexist. Section 
3.5 concludes.
’Amother possible justification for the claim that adverse selection becomes more severe in modern 
economies is that information about peers flows better within village economies. This is the type of 
argument usually put forward by the theories proposing group lending in village economies; e.g., Ghatak 
(19991 and Van Tassel (1999). Since the focus of this paper is on the process of development and 
iiidustirialisation, and not on how to improve efficiency within the rural economy, I do not attempt to 
ruodeJ this point.
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3.2 E nvironm ent
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which life evolves over a discrete-time 
infinite horizon, t =  {0,1, ...oo}. The economy is small and enjoys perfect access to
Individuals in the economy live for two periods. In every period t a continuum of 
individuals with mass normalised to 1 is born. As a result, in every period t the economy 
is populated by two different generations, each one with unit mass: those who were
All individuals are born with an identical endowment of 1 unit of time, which they use
old, they can choose either to retire or to become entrepreneurs. Retiring yields zero 
income.
Young agents may choose to work in two different occupations: they can work in 
the agricultural sector, becoming independent labourers working in a communal plot 
of land; alternatively they can work in the manufacturing sector as employees for old 
entrepreneurs, earning there a fixed wage v.
Any old agent may decide to become an entrepreneur. However, not all them would 
be equally good as entrepreneurs. In particular, there exist two types (or qualities) of 
entrepreneur indexed by T  € {£,G}, where B  (G) stands for bad-types (good-types). 
The good-types represent a fraction 77 e (0,1) of the population and possess higher ex­
pected productivity as entrepreneurs than the bad-types do, who comprise the remaining 
fraction (1 -  77). The fractions of good- and bad-types (77 and 1 — 77) are constant over 
time. Regarding the informational structure in the economy, the type is assumed private 
information. In other words, entrepreneurial ability is subject to asymmetric information.
Individuals are risk averse. Furthermore, there is a subsistence level of consumption, 
which I normalise to 1, below which utility falls to —00 . To simplify the analysis, I 
assume individuals care only about consumption in the second period (hence, all the 
income they earn while young will be saved and invested to provide future consumption). 
In particular, I assume the Bernoulli utility function of individual i born in t is given by:
international credit markets at the fixed international (net) interest rate r  =  0 .
born in t — 1 (the old in period t ), and those born in period t (the young in period t).
entirely to work while they are young. In the second period of life, when individuals are
ln(cf>t+i -  1) if citt+ 1 > 1 
—00 otherwise;
(3.1)
where c^i+ 1 denotes the consumption in t -f 1 by agent i born in t.
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3.2 .1  A gricu ltural Sector Technology
Aggregate production in the agricultural sector (Y)  depends on the total amount of com­
munal land (A), and on the mass of young agents working in the agricultural sector (L), 
following a Cobb-Douglas production function. There are no property rights over land, 
thus each agricultural labourer obtains as income the average output y(L) =  Y(L)/L .  
The amount of land is fixed at X  > 0. Hence, Y  can be written as follows:6
Y(L) = La, where a  £ (0,1). (3.2)
3.2 .2  M anufacturing Sector T echnology
Production in the manufacturing sector requires 1 unit of entrepreneurial skill (coming 
from the old generation) and raw labour (coming from the young generation). The return 
of the entrepreneurial projects is random, subject to an idiosyncratic shock. I suppose 
there are only two possible outcomes for the projects: success or failure. Imagine an 
old agent hires I units of young labour at the beginning of period £; then, in the event 
of success, the project yields pl units of output at the end of t, where p > 0. On the 
other hand, in the event of failure, the project yields 0 output regardless of I. A good- 
type undertaking an entrepreneurial project fails with probability </> £ (0 , 1), whereas a 
bad-type fails with probability equal to 1.
Each entrepreneur is a price taker and must thus pay the market wage vt for each 
unit of labour hired. I assume entrepreneurs must pay workers’ wages at the beginning 
of the production process. As a result, the amount l iv t equals the total investment by 
entrepreneur i.
3.2 .3  F inancia l M arkets
C red it M arket: All credit market transactions between natives and with the rest of the 
world are mediated by banks. The local credit market is characterised by free entry and 
absence of set-up or sunk costs. As a result, banks must make zero profit in equilibrium. 
All individuals in the economy enjoy perfect access to the credit market. I assume 
individuals always choose to honour their debts, should they be able to pay back lenders 
the agreed amount specified in the credit contract. In other words, there are no moral 
hazard problems contaminating the operation of credit markets.
6The expression in (3.2) is a reduced form of Y ( X , L )  — A X 1~nL n , under the assumption that 
X  =  The fact that y{  1) — 1 guarantees that this economy can always meet the subsistence
level of consumption (and, consequently, the individuals’ optimisation problem is always well-defined).
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Insu rance  M arket: The insurance market is run by a continuum of insurance compa­
nies j  € Xt which offer contracts that protect against entrepreneurial failure. There exist 
no sunk or set-up costs in the insurance industry. I suppose insurance contracts cannot 
be negotiated in advance; in other words, a contract agreed in period t  only covers events 
occurring during t. Throughout this paper, when referring to the insurance market, I will 
make use of the equilibrium concept defined in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) -  hereafter, 
this equilibrium concept will be referred to as RS.  Because of the well-known equilibrium 
(non-)existence problem when using RS,  the fraction of bad-types (1 — 77) will accordingly 
be assumed large enough so as to ensure the existence of an RS.
Without any loss of generality, I assume that each insurance company offers at most 
one contract to each entrepreneur i. An insurance contract offered by j  to i in period 
t can be written as follows: ,t=[qi,t, 'Pi,t{qi,t',k,t,Uitt - 1)] € K+ x E. This contract
specifies the payment V^t{qi,t'i') that * must make in order to buy qij units of an Arrow- 
Debreu commodity that pays back 1 unit of income in the event of entrepreneurial failure, 
conditional on the amount of labour hired l{tt (i.e. the size of his entrepreneurial project) 
and the income generated in the first period
Entrepreneurs will receive (in principle) contract offers from several insurance compa­
nies. Accordingly, let =  {Ci,j , t}je j f denote the set of all insurance contracts offered 
to entrepreneur i in period t.
An important feature of the insurance contracts observed in the model is that they 
condition on the amount of labour hired by the entrepreneurs. In other words, k is 
publicly verifiable and, furthermore, insurance companies make use of the implicit in­
formation conveyed by this variable. The assumption that k  is publicly verifiable is 
necessary for the existence of an R S  in this particular model.7
3.3 S ta tic  E quilibrium  A n alysis
Fix the time in period t  and consider the problem faced by the agent i born in t — 1. 
Suppose this agent has earned income equal to while he was young. Additionally,
let his type be T  =  { B , G } ,  and let <j)T = 1 if T  =  B  and (j)T — (j) if T  — G. Then, given
7T o see this, recall that bad-types fail with probability equal to 1. As a result, no matter what value 
of I the bad-types announced they would choose, in case I were unverifiable, they would (ex-post) always 
optimally choose / =  0. This deviation by the bad-types from their (unverifiable) announcements would 
always destroy the Rothschild and Stiglitz (separating) equilibrium in this model.
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vt, this agent solves:
max : E ( u n - 1) =  <j>T ln (si,t +  Qi,t ~ 1) +  (1 — ^ t)  (si,t "1“ Pk,t ~ 1) (3-3)
S i , t , U , t  ' P i , t ( ' ) ]
subject to: Sij +  Vij,{qi,u k,t,Vi,t-1) +  v t k,t =  Wi,t-1> (3-4)
[qi,ti 'Pi,t{qi,t'i k,t,Ui,t-i)\ £ Q-i,t, and k,t > 0. (3-5)
Where s* denotes the amount lent to (or borrowed from, if negative) banks at the interest 
rate r  = 0.8
Let Yr denote the set of young agents in period r , and ©T denote the set of old agents 
in period r. Define tt t-1  : ^ t - i  as the function that summarises the income earned
by each agent in T t- i  during his youth. Then, given £lt-i, an equilibrium in period t is 
a collection {sitt,k,u [Qi,uVi,t(qi,t\ *)] ,£* ,theet and a market wage v t , such that:
1. The allocation (s^t, k,u [<li,u •)]), s°lves (3-3) subject to (3.4) and (3.5) for 
each i £ Ot-
2. Given the set of contracts Oitt offered to each i £ ©*: (i) No contract belonging to 
Oi}t makes negative expected profits, and (ii) there exists no other feasible contract 
3 ^ 0.i}t, which, if offered in addition to Oi}t, would make positive expected profits.
3. Each agent in the set Y* selects the occupation in t to maximise (3.1).
4. The labour market clears; i.e. JQ k,tdi =  1 — Lt-
Young agents will choose the occupation (agricultural labourers vs. manufacturing 
employees) that yields higher income. Therefore, in equilibrium, =  m ax { ft,L f-1 } 
will hold for all i £ Yt and all t > 0. From this expression we can first observe that all 
individuals of the same generation will earn identical incomes when young, i.e., — ujt
for all i £ Yt and t > 0 .
Second, when the young are indifferent between occupations, the wage in the manu­
facturing sector must thus be equal to the average productivity in the agricultural sector. 
Alternatively, when all the young agents specialise in the agricultural sector, uit =  1 > v t . 
Similarly, if all young agents specialise in the manufacturing sector, cu* =  vt > 0a_1. No­
tice that since 0a_1 —> oo, a situation in which Lt — 0 (i.e., full manufacturing speciali­
sation) will never hold in equilibrium, as it would require v t —> oo, which is incompatible 
with non-negative entrepreneurial profits. As a result, it turns out that — L^~l > v t 
will always prevail in equilibrium.
8 Notice that the agent i may optimally set £; =  0. We can interpret this decision of i as retiring when 
old.
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3.3.1 Insurance C ontracts and E ntrepreneurial In vestm en t  
Incentive-Com patible Contracts
Let <Gt  and ®T denote, respectively, the subset of good- and bad-types born in r. If 
insurance contracts intend to condition on the agent’s type, bad-types must be induced 
to truthfully reveal their (unobservable) type. Insurance companies will screen agents 
by restricting the maximum amount of insurance that old individuals are allowed to 
purchase, conditional on their first-period earnings and their choices of I. More precisely, 
given L0t- 1, the level of qt will be set low enough so as to dissuade any h G ®*_i from 
deviating from his outside option and mimic the behaviour of an agent i G Gt_i. These 
sorts of contract are incentive-compatible, screening out the bad-types. The drawback 
of this screening policy is that when limiting insurance provision below first-best levels, 
insurers might also end up discouraging first-best risk-taking by good-types.
Perfect competition in the insurance market implies that in an equilibrium where 
types are screened, any i G Gt_i should face Pct-i (9Gf_i > •)/QGt-i = Denote by l^t_ 
the level of l^t that solves (3.3)-(3.5) when i G G^_i. A bad-type trying to "disguise" 
himself as a good-type should also hire workers (otherwise, he would be assessed as 
a bad-type). Therefore, incentive-compatibility for any h G ®*-i requires the following 
condition to hold:
ln(wt_i -  1) > ln[wt_i -  v t +  (1 -  </>)qt ~ 1]; (3.6)
where qt denotes the maximum level of insurance that old agents in period t are allowed 
to buy at a unit price (j), if they hire l^t_ workers. The right-hand side of (3.6) shows 
the level of utility achieved by any h G ®t_i when he replicates the portfolio allocation 
chosen by a member of Gt- i  (given qt). On the other hand, the left-hand side equals the 
utility that any member of ®t_i would achieve by investing all his first-period earnings 
in the safe asset at r = 0 (that is, by setting st = this investment policy represents
the outside option available to the bad-types. Thus, (3.6) wipes out the existence of a 
profitable deviation available to agents in the set ®*_i.
Optimal Risk-Taking under Imperfect Insurance Markets
Following the former discussion on incentive-compatible insurance contracts, the opti­
misation problem (3.3)-(3.5) for any good-type born it t — 1 can thus be rewritten as 
follows (to reduce notation, for the rest of the paper ujt -1  > 1 will always be implicitly
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assumed unless otherwise explicitly noted):9
it>0,gt>0
max : E(ut- i )  =  </> In [ut- 1 +  (1 -  <f>)qt ~ v t k  ~  1]
(3.7)
+ (1 -(f)) In [wt_i -  <f>qt + {p~ v t)lt -  1]
subject to: qt < qt- (3.8)
The solution of the optimisation problem (3.3)-(3.5), together with the incentive 
compatibility constraint (3.6), yields the following result (the full derivation of (3.9) is 
provided in the Appendix):
The expression in (3.9) summarises the risk-taking behaviour of the good-types born 
in t — 1 when adverse selection in the insurance market prevents full risk-sharing. A key 
property of (3.9) is that -whenever (1 — (j>) p > v t-  entrepreneurial investment by the 
good-types (i.e., ) is an increasing and convex function of their initial income.
In particular, its elasticity with respect to cot-i is strictly larger than l .10 This convex 
response with respect to Ut-i is due to the fact that, given the specification in (3.1), 
individuals display decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). When preferences exhibit 
DRRA, the fraction of initial income invested in riskier assets is increasing in the indi­
vidual’s initial income -  see Mas-Colell et al (1995), pp. 185-194. Since in this model 
insurance is imperfectly provided, investing in the entrepreneurial projects entails a risky 
decision, and will thus increase convexly with the initial income of the good-types.
The equation (3.9) can alternatively be seen as the individual labour demand function. 
As it is the usual case, we can observe that labour demand is decreasing in the wage v*.11
3.3 .2  E quilibrium  in th e  Labour M arket
The last variable that remains to be determined in order to characterise fully the equi­
librium in period t is the market wage vt. This variable is pinned down in the labour
9In any case, as it will be formally proved in Section 3.4, u t - i  >  1 will always hold in equilibrium 
within a full dynamic setting -  see Lemma 5.
10This elasticity equals — 1), for all (1 — </>) p >  v t .
11 There is, though, a difference between (3.9) and the standard neoclassical labour demand function. 
In the neoclassical case, labour demand is decreasing in the wage because firms need to adjust the 
(decreasing) marginal productivity of labour to the higher wage. In this model, the production function 
pi is linear then, provided ( 1  — <j>) p >  v t , labour demand should (in principle) not respond to higher 
wages. However, because of imperfect insurance provision, when Vt rises, entrepreneurs need to reduce 
their labour demand in order to achieve better consumption smoothing across states of nature.
' G t _ i   ^ 0 ,  t  {y^ t—i  1 )
<t> Vt
if (1 -  0) p > v,
(3.9)
V o
if (1 -<j>)p = v t , 
if (1 -<f>)p< v t .
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market, where the labour supply derives from the optimal occupational choice of the 
young generation, while the labour demand results from adding up (3.9) across all good- 
types born in t -  1. To avoid the trivial case in which no manufacturing sector ever arises 
in equilibrium, I impose the following condition:
A ssum ption  1 (1 — 0) p >  1.
The equilibrium in the labour market in period t is determined by the intersection of 
the labour demand (Zf 1) and labour supply (if) correspondences, where:
1 - 0 1
>)— - K - i  - 1)
<j> v t
1 - 0 1 /0 , 77—  (wt_ 1 -  1)
0
1 -
0  Vt
if (1 -  <f>)p >  v u 
if (1 - 4 > ) p  =  v t , 
if (1 -  0 )p  < v t .
if v t <  1, 
if vt > 1.
(3.10)
(3.11)
Notice that when Vt > 1, i f  — 1 — y~l (v t), where y~1 (•) is the inverse function of the 
average agricultural output y(L). This is the case because when Vt > 1, the young must 
be indifferent between working in the agricultural or in the manufacturing sector, hence 
i f  must be such that vt =  y ( l  — if) .
Let 11 and v £ denote henceforth the labour market equilibrium values of I and v,  and
define Cj =  1 + , where notice that Cj >  1.
Proposition 6 (Labour Market Equilibrium)
(i) Whenever uit-i > 1, the equilibrium wage v £ is a non-decreasing function of 001- \ .  
In particular, if  ujt- \  > 1, v*t (wt- 1) : (l,oo) —> (1,(1 -  <f>)p], such that: a) for all 
wt- \  G ( l ,w ) ,  vl <  (1 — 0)p and v * is strictly increasing in u)t - i ;  b) for all cot- i  >  Cj , 
v^ ~  (1 -  0)p. Furthermore, whenever wt - 1 > 1, If — 1 -  (l/u ^ cu t-i)) 1^ 1-"^ thus
i ; e (  0 , 1).
(ii) I f  wt - 1 G [0,1], then v^ G [0,1] and 1% — 0.
Proof. In Appendix, m
F ig u r e  3.1 provides a visual illustration of the equilibrium in the labour market for 
four different levels of wt- \ ,  namely: wa,uib, Cj and u c (where, 1 <  wa <  ay, <  Cj <  w c).n
12Although not drawn in FIGURE 3.1, when u t - 1 €  [0,1] the labour demand is a straight line along 
It — 0  (i.e., i f  (•) coincides with the vertical axis). As a result, for all wf_ i £  [0 , 1 ], /tD(wt_ i , v t) and i f  ( v t ) 
intersect each other at l t =  0, along the whole segment v t €  [0 ,1 ]; which is the result (ii) in Proposition 
6 .
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F ig ure  3.1: Labour Market Equilibrium.
Labour market equilibrium for four different levels of
Proposition 6 describes how v£ responds positively to the previous generation first- 
period income (cjf_i). Since a larger uit- 1 leads to higher risk-taking by the good-types, 
labour demand turns out to be (weakly) increasing in ut-i-  As labour demand increases 
with Ut-i, the equilibrium wage v£ must rise to attract some additional young agents 
from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. This positive impact of u>t-i 
and Vf represents the key mechanism that may give rise to multiple long-run equilibria.
3.4 D yn am ic A nalysis
In order to characterise the dynamic behaviour of the economy, it proves convenient to 
state the following preliminary result:
Lem m a 5 uiT G [1, (1 — 0) p], regardless of the value of wT- i ,  for all r  G {1,2, ...oo}.
Proof. Firstly, notice that the minimum value coT can take in equilibrium is 1, as this is 
the average productivity of the agricultural sector when LT =  1. Secondly, observe from 
(3.10) that if  Vj- > (1 0) p ,  then I = 0 . As a result, all the young population alive in
t should work in the agricultural sector, whose average productivity would then equal 1. 
Therefore, coT > (1 — 0) p cannot hold in equilibrium either. ■
From Lemma 5, it follows that we can restrict the state space of u>t-1  to the interval 
[1, (1 — 0) p). When u)t- \  G (1, (1 -  0) p], the equilibrium in the (manufacturing sector) 
labour market encompasses If G (0,1). Therefore, young agents alive in t must be
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indifferent between the two occupations, earning uh = v t = 2/(1 ~ It)- On the other 
hand, when ojt- \  =  1, labour demand by entrepreneurs falls to zero, and all the young 
generation must thus go to the agricultural sector, earning income wt — y(l) =  1. Define 
u> = min {o>, (1 — <j>)p). We can thus write down the law of motion for u>t as follows:
behaviour of wt - Alternatively, if u> < (1 — 0)p, the dynamics of cuf are determined by 
=  0 when u t- \  £ [1, u>], while wt =  (1 — 0 )p when wt- \  £ (cu, (1 — 0 )p].
Lemma 6 ^(u)t-i,uJt) = 0 yields a mapping : [1, cZ>] —» [1,(1 — 4>) p\, which is
strictly increasing and strictly convex in
Proof. In Appendix. ■
Given the specific parametric configuration of the model, we can find three different 
types of dynamics in terms of their qualitative features and their long-run equilibria.
Proposition 7 (Long-Run Equilibria)
(i) Suppose — 4>)\ £ (1 — a, 1). Then, there exists a threshold level p(a) > 
1 / ( 1  — (j>), where p'(a) >  0 ,  such that: V p  > p(a), there exist two (locally) stable station­
ary equilibria, namely, co =  1 and co =  (1 — 4>)p.
(ii) Suppose 0 /  [77(1 — 0)] > 1. Then, the only stable stationary equilibrium in the econ­
omy is uj — 1. In addition, if <f>/ [rj (1 -  0)] € (1 — a, 1) holds, but p < p{ot), then the 
only stable stationary equilibrium in the economy is u> =  l . 13
(Hi) Suppose 0 /  [77 (1 — 0)] < 1 — a. Then, the only stable stationary equilibrium in the 
economy is u  =  (1 — 0 )p.
Proof. In Appendix. ■
Proposition 7 shows that when 0 / [77 (1 -  0)] £ (1 — a, 1), two (locally) stable long- 
run equilibria may coexist in the economy. First, we have a poverty trap in which w =  1 
and Z =  0 ; in other words, an equilibrium where the economy is poor (it just affords 
subsistence consumption) and fully agricultural. Second, there might be a higher-income 
long-run equilibrium in which lj = (1 - 0 )/? and I £ (0 , 1), (so part of the economy works in 
the manufacturing sector). This higher-income equilibrium arises when p is large enough;
13 In the specific situation 0 /  [77 (1 -  0)] £ (1 -  a , 1) and p =  p(a) ,  the point ui =  (1 -  <f>)p becomes 
another stationary point, but in this case it is unstable.
Law of Motion:
(u , ( l  -<A)/>] fi 0.
(3.12)
If Cj > (1 — 0 )p, then the implicit function ^ ( c ^ - i ,^ )  =  0 alone depicts the dynamic
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in other words, when the manufacturing sector is sufficiently productive. This last result 
seems quite intuitive. Proposition 6 shows that, within a certain range, a larger cot-i 
leads to higher wages in period t; when p is sufficiently large, the entrepreneurial projects 
are so productive that the positive impact of uit- i  on v £ extends over such a long interval 
that a higher-income stable stationary point arises in the model.
1
0 10 1 co
(a) case (i): ( l - a . l )  a  p > p(a) (b) case (ii): or T cfe6 (1 _ a -1) A P < p(“ )
0 (l-*) p C0MI
(c) case (iii): p / [ n ( l - 0 ) ] < l -a  
F i g u r e  3.2: Initial income dynamics.
F ig ure  3 .2  displays examples of the three distinct cases discussed in Proposition 7. 
In (a), a situation leading to multiple long-run equilibria is shown. Whenever uiq >  cj, uit 
will be continuously growing over time, converging monotonically towards ui — (1 -  <j>)p. 
During this process, 1% will also be rising, meaning both that the manufacturing sector 
is expanding and that risk-taking by the entrepreneurs is increasing. On the other hand, 
if ujq < cj,  the economy will converge over time towards ui =  1 (a poverty trap), where 
It =  0. Essentially, in w =  1 individuals are so poor that they completely refrain 
from risk-taking as a way to avoid the (dramatically) low levels of consumption that 
would prevail in the event of failure. This, in turn, implies that labour demand in 
the manufacturing sector falls to zero; thus, the entire young generation must resort to
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agricultural production, driving down its average productivity to y(l) — 1. As a result, 
oj = 1 becomes self-sustaining.14
In FIGURE 3 .2 .(b) the poverty trap represents the unique long-run equilibrium. This 
situation arises when the failure probability 0 is sufficiently large. In other words, when 
entrepreneurial projects are sufficiently risky, inefficient insurance provision prevents the 
economy from breaking away from the poverty trap in c j  =  1 .
Finally, in FIGURE 3.2.(c) a case in which, for any ojo > 1, the economy converges 
to uj — p{ 1 — 0) in the long run is plotted. In contrast with the example in F i g u r e  
3.2.(b), this situation appears when 0 is small enough. Intuitively, when the failure 
risk is sufficiently low, inefficient insurance provision will not discourage entrepreneurial 
investment too severely, and the economy will thus move over time towards u> =  p{\ — 0).
Further Discussion: relaxing decreasing relative risk aversion
The possibility that the model displays multiple long-run equilibria crucially depends on 
the positive impact of ujt-i on v*. This effect requires that individuals display decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA), so that the richer they are, the more they invest in the 
(risky) entrepreneurial projects. Yet, this model has assumed that individuals exhibit a 
stronger property, namely decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). One might wonder 
how sensitive the results are to this last assumption.
Given the set-up of the model (in particular, given that the technology in all sectors in 
the economy is convex), DRRA is a necessary feature for multiple long-run equilibria to 
coexist. In other words, situations like the one depicted in FIGURE 3.2.(a) can only arise 
when DRRA is assumed. Alternative utility functions that drop DRRA but maintain 
DARA may still give rise to dynamics with poverty traps similar to the one plotted in 
F i g u r e  3.2.(b), or convergence to high income similar to the one in F i g u r e  3.2.(c ) ,  
depending on the specific parametric configurations. However, they cannot generate 
dynamics where both types of long-run equilibria coexist.15 The key reason why DRRA 
is required for generating non-ergodic dynamics is that risk-taking must be sufficiently 
responsive to income variations, so that the curvature of the schedule generated by (3.12) 
is sufficiently pronounced (hence it crosses the 45° line at least once from below).
3.5 C onclud ing R em arks
This paper has presented a model in which, along the path of development, the econ­
omy evolves from a small-scale rural economy to an entrepreneurial manufacturing one.
14The point u> =  u j  is also a stationary equilibrium in FIGURE 3 .2 .(a), but it is unstable.
15 A formal exposition of these results is available from the author upon request.
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Following such a development path is however not guaranteed because an adverse selec­
tion problem prevents the provision of first-best insurance contracts which are needed 
to support entrepreneurial manufacturing activities. Development to a manufacturing 
economy tends to fail to take place when entrepreneurial activities encompass very high 
risks, since those are the cases in which efficient insurance provision matters most for 
encouraging entrepreneurship.
In terms of risk-bearing, some results of the model are in contrast with those of 
Banerjee and Newman (1991). In their paper, poorer agents bear the risks, while richer 
agents choose safer activities (they become "rentiers"); see also Newman (2007) for similar 
results. Their results are driven by the fact that riskier activities require agents to exert 
(unobservable) effort. Since effort is assumed to enter linearly in a separable utility 
function, whereas marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, the marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for consumption is increasing in initial wealth. As a result, it 
turns out to be easier to incentivize poorer agents to exert high effort if they bear some 
risk. In my model, this incentives problem does not arise, as I disregard moral hazard 
issues. Similarly, Banerjee and Newman (1991) disregard adverse selection problems by 
assuming that all agents are intrinsically identical in terms of skills. From an empirical 
point of view, it is clear that initial wealth represents a key determinant of entrepreneurial 
choice due to the presence of financial markets imperfections -  see, for example, Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989). In that sense, this paper contributes to the literature on informational 
asymmetries and development by providing a mechanism that relies on adverse selection 
to generate a market failure that keeps the poor away from entrepreneurial activities.16
Lastly, the model could yield a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon of under­
migration from small villages to the city, similarly as proposed by Banerjee and Newman 
(1998), though they look at credit rather than insurance. In that regard, migrating to 
the city could be interpreted as investing in a risky asset with higher expected income. 
The local village, on the other hand, provides its inhabitants with deep social networks 
that protect them from idiosyncratic shocks (Das Gupta (1987) and Hugo (1982)). This 
interpretation seems also consistent with the view that information inside the villages 
flows better; hence adverse selection there would be less troublesome than in the cities.
16A passage in Newman (2007) is worth mentioning here. He states "Since embedding the Knightian 
theory [of entrepreneurship] into a standard moral hazard framework reveals the fragility of its predictions 
[regarding risk-bearing], it is natural to ask what happens in the presence of other causes of imperfect 
insurance."
The results of my paper should not be understood as Knightian, though. Adverse selection prevents 
efficient risk-sharing; hence the rich, who are less risk-averse, take on larger risks. Yet, entrepreneurs here 
are undertaking a productive task (for which they are particularly talented), and not providing insurance 
to other individuals (workers) through fixed wages, which seems to be the essence of the Knightian theory.
61
A p p en d ix
Derivation of Equation (3.9). I proceed here to derive each one of the expressions in 
(3.9). It proves convenient to first state the following preliminary results:
Lemma A .I. If (1 -  <f))p > v t , the incentive-compatible insurance quantity qt must be 
strictly smaller than the full-information insurance provision level.
Proof. Suppose instead that qt is equal or larger than the insurance provision under a 
full-information when (1 -  <f)p > v t . Then, in the optimum, the constraint (3.8) should 
not bind, and the first-order conditions for problem (3.7)-(3.8) would yield: lt > 0 and 
qt — pit . Replacing these values into (3.6) yields that to comply with the incentive 
compatibility constraint [(1 — (p)p -  vt] It < 0 must hold; which contradicts the facts 
that (1 — (j))p > vt and It > 0. ||
Lemma A .2. Suppose (1 — 0) p > v t . Then, in the optimum, the problem (3.7) -  (3.8) 
yields: qt =  qt and
* _ i
Gt“1 v t
(1 - < f > ) p - v t , , (1 -  4 > f p  +  2 < j ) V t - V t  ^
(u)t - 1  -  1) + ---------------------------------- qt
v t  p ~ v t
(3.13)
Proof. Whenever qt is below the full-information insurance provision level, the constraint 
(3.8) will bind, and thus qt — qt will apply in the solution of problem (3.7)- (3.8). As a 
result, when (1 — <p)p > vt, the following first-order condition for It obtains:
_(l -</>) (p - v t )_____________________________ <M ______________=
(cjt-i -  1) -  (j)qt + (P ~ v t ) {uJt-i ~ 1) +  (1 ~<f>)qt~ v t l ^
Finally, from this expression, (3.13) immediately follows after some simple algebra. ||
Lem m a A .3. Suppose (1 — (j)) p > vt- Then, in equilibrium, qt —
Proof. Firstly, notice that from (3.6) qt < v t l^t l /{ \  — 4>) can be readily obtained. 
Secondly, suppose that (3.6) does not bind. In that case, insurance companies could 
actually offer a contract carrying qt> qt, which would still screen out the bad-types and 
that will make all the good-types better off. Hence, in equilibrium, qt =  vt l^t / ( I  — <f>) 
must apply. ||
By using the results in Lemmas A.2 and A.3, we can replace qt — Vtl^t l / ( l  — <f) 
into (3.13), to obtain ^ t_i =  (u t - i  — 1) when (1 — <f>) p > v t .
Suppose now v t =  (1 -  4>) p. Replacing v t by (1 — <f>) p into (3.6), yields qt < pl& ■ 
In equilibrium, qt — pl'^,t_l will hold, for a similar argument as in Lemma A.3. Then, 
the agent i G G*_i will optimally set qt =  plt (which in fact represents the same solution 
that would apply under full information). As a result, his optimisation problem can be
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simplified to: maxJ(>o : (ln(u;*_i -  1)}. This last problem can be trivially maximised 
by any feasible value of Z*. In particular, any It G 0, (w^-i — 1) , may solve the
previous optimisation problem.
Finally, when (1 — <f>) p < v t , Z£ must equal zero, since by investing all their first- 
period income in the safe-asset, good-types can obtain a higher expected return without 
bearing any risks.
P ro o f of P roposition  6. Part (i). Inspecting (3.10) and (3.11) we can observe that, 
for all ujt- 1 G (!,& ), v t is pinned down by the following equation:
v- (j) v (3.14)
as equation (3.14) yields indeed £ (1,(1 — 0)p), £ (1,&)- Next, totally differ­
entiating (3.14), we obtain:
-l
dvl 1
dujt- =  v-t-1 V-
1
0
' U t - l  -  1 +  1
1 — a  V v > 0.
In addition, since v% £ (1, (1 — </>) p), from (3.11) it follows that Z£ =  1 —(1 / v ^ u t - i ) ) 1^ 1 a\
for all u)t-i G (1,&). Hence, Z£ £ (0,1).
i
Now, let uit-1  =  Cj and note that Zf ((1 -  0) p) =  1 — 1_" =  (<Pp)~1V (Cj — 1).
Furthermore, observe thus that: Zf((l — 0) p) < (4>p)~l ri (ujt- \  -  1) for any ujt- \  > Cj. 
Therefore, since i f  = 0 for all v t > (1 — 0) p, and i f  — [0, (<jjp)~lr) (wt-i -  1)] for v t = 
(1 -  0)p; then, for any uJt-i > Cj, the labour market equilibrium yields vf  =  
and I* = ((j)p)~lr](Cj -  1). ||
Part (ii).  For all u>t-1 G [0,1], labour demand equals zero. Therefore, in equilibrium, 
Zf must equal zero too; which requires v% £ [0,1]. ■
P ro o f of Lem m a 6. Differentiating 4/(cot- i ,u t )  =  0 in (3.12) by using the rule of
derivation for implicit functions yields:
-l
dut
dujt- v-
l - c j j l  -  4>ut - 1 -  l  , lrj—  --------------- +
0 1 - 0  \ U J t
1 \  1-a
> 0 , Vajf_i £ [l,w]. (3.15)
Next, differentiating (3.15) with respect to ojt- \  yields:
d2ujt _  dujt/dujt-i J (  dujt 
(dcut-i)2 A bit
Mojt-1 G [l,w]; where: A =
\ 2  1 / ( 1 —a )_ ( l - a )  UJt n
+ v (  1 - 0 )  (wt- 1  -  1)
1 / ( 1 —a)'
> 0.
T)(l -  0)
(3.16)
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Hence, the sign of d2uJt/(dujt-i)2 is determined by the sign of the expression within 
braces in the right-hand side of (3.16). Using then (3.15) and some simple algebra, we 
can observe that:
dlujt > 0,VcJi_i G [1,oj] a  >  0.
(dwt- 1)2
P ro o f of P roposition  7. Part (i ). First of all, notice that the point ujt =  1 represents 
always a stationary point of (3.12), since 4/(1,1) =  0. Next, given the statement in 
Lemma 6 , it follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for w =  1 to be locally 
stable is that the first derivative in (3.15) computed at u>t-1  =  1 is strictly smaller than 
1. Thus, replacing wt- \  = uJt =  1 into (3.15), we get:
dwt
dujt-
Therefore, 4>/ [p (1 — <j))\> \ — a  implies du>tdcj. u i t - 1=1
< 1.
Second, since cu* = (1 — <j)) p for all 0Jt~\ G (a), (1 — 0)p], whenever this interval 
is non-empty; in order to show that u>t =  (1 — <j>) p is also a locally stable stationary 
equilibrium, it suffices to prove that, under the stipulated conditions, Cj < (1 — (j>) p. 
From the expressions in (3.10) and (3.11), we can observe that:
1Cj < (1 — «=>
V <P (1 -4>)p (l -  4>)p_
(3.17)
M ( p ) N ( p , a )
From (3.17), it follows that:
■ i m , M(fij = N(p, a) = 0,
lim ^oo M(p) =  ”t1r*> > lim ^oo N(p, a) =  1.
(3.18)
(3.19)
Differentiating M (p) and N(p, a) with respect to p, we obtain: dM/dp — rj/4>p2, and
dN/dp  =  [(1 — a) p] 1 
dM
(i -<f>)p
 > dN
dp < dp &
. Therefore: 
77(1 -  4>)
( l - a ) g 1 (3.20)(1 -  0)p_
Denote by p(a) the value of p that solves the second expression in (3.20) with strict 
equality; that is:
1
(3.21)
L(1-(A)PJ ’
where it can be observed that p(a) > 1/(1 -  </>). Then, the expression in (3.20), together 
with (3.21) and the fact that qSj [p (1 — </>)] > 1  — a, imply:
1) for all p G (1/ (1 -  (j) ) , p(a)): dM/dp < dN/dp
2) for all p > p(a): dM/dp > dN/dp
3) when p = p(a): dM/dp  =  dN/dp.
(3.22)
(3.23)
(3.24)
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As a result, combining (3.22) and (3.24) with the result in (3.18), we can deduce that 
M(p) < N (p ,a ) for all p G (1 /(1  -  4>) ,p(a)\■ Furthermore, because of (3.23) and the 
result in (3.19), we can observe that: 3p > p(a), such that M(p) = N(p,a), and 
M(p) > N (p ,a ) for all p > p, while M(p) < N (p ,a ) for all p < p. Using again (3.17), 
we can observe that p must solve:
1 - 0 ( 1  - 4 ) p - i  ,ri—   -   =  1 -
_(1 -  (f))p_
(3.25)
(1 -  (f))p
from where it follows that p — p(a). This completes the proof that 3p(a) > 1/ (1 -  0), 
such that for all p > p(a) there exists another locally stable stationary point at w = 
(1 -  0 ) p.
Finally, totally differentiating (3.25), we get:
dp
da
(i-« r (1 -4>)p In [(1 -  <f>)p]
1 1
(1 -  0)p_
1
1 —a
(3.26)
(f>p2 (1 - a ) p
Given that at p = p, dM/dp > dN/dp, the denominator in the right-hand side of (3.26) 
must thus be positive. Furthermore, the numerator in the right-hand side of (3.26) is 
also positive, because p > 1/(1 — 0). As a result, it follows that dp/da > 0. ||
Part (ii). Note first that dN /da  > 0 . As a result, if (3.17) does not hold for a  —> 0, 
it will then not hold for any a G (0,1) either. Taking the limit on the expressions in 
(3.17) as a —* 0, we obtain:
if 0: Cj < (1 — 0) p ri 1 - 1
(1 -  0)p_ > 1
1
(1 -  0)p (3.27)
Therefore, if 0 /  [77 (1  — 0 )] > 1 , (3.27) implies that Cj > (1  — (f>) p when a —> 0, and thus 
the only stable stationary point is u = 1.
Lastly, the proof that if 0 /  [77 (1  — 0 )] G (1  — a, 1 ) holds, but p < p(a), then the only 
stable stationary equilibrium is the point u — 1, is implicit in the previous proof of Part 
(i) of this proposition. ||
Part (Hi). If 0 / [77 (1 — 0)] < 1 — a, then: dujtdut- 1 > 1. As a consequence,u > t ~  1=1
the fixed point c j  = 1 is locally unstable. Moreover, because ^ (u ^ c ^ - i)  =  0 yields an 
increasing an convex function in cjf~i, it follows that:
d u t
>  1, V w t-i G [l,w ]. (3.28)dwt - 1
Given (3.28), and given that w =  1 is a fixed point, it follows that u>t > cJt-i for all 
cjt-i G (1,0]. Therefore, c j  < u), and c j  = (1 — 0)p  thus represents the unique stable fixed 
point of (3.12). ■
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Chapter 4
Incom e D ivergence in a R icardian M odel of 
International Trade w ithout A bsolute  
A dvantages
4.1 In trod u ction
In the past two decades a number of articles on international trade have acknowledged 
the importance of using non-homothetic preferences to capture some relevant features 
of North-South trade -  e.g., Matsuyama (2000), Flam and Helpman (1987), and Stokey 
(1991). These papers have developed tractable models that predict patterns of speciali­
sation where richer countries produce and export goods with high value added and high 
income demand elasticity. One of the main predictions of those models is that the impact 
of international trade on growth may be uneven across countries which are at different 
stages in the process of development. More precisely, trade would tend to be more benefi­
cial to developed economies, and it may even be detrimental to underdeveloped countries. 
The key mechanism at work is the one originally argued by Prebish (1950) and Singer 
(1950). That is, the fact that as the world income rises, world aggregate demand deviates 
towards the goods produced by richer economies (the North), which improves their terms 
of trade and, thereby, magnifies initial income disparities between South and North.
The papers mentioned above have thus restricted the attention to a world economy 
where some countries (the North) have somehow historically accumulated larger amounts 
of human and physical capital than others (the South), and show conditions under which 
trade magnifies initial income disparities resulting from those capital differences. How­
ever, the pattern of international specialisation and trade might also be the source of 
income differentials between countries that do not display any substantial dissimilarity 
regarding their levels of human and physical capital. In this paper, we look at economies 
that start off with similar capital endowments and income per head, and propose a theory
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of uneven growth induced by trade based on non-homothetic preferences and productive 
specialisation driven by comparative advantages.
Our paper is based on four fundamental elements. First, each consumption good in 
the economy is present in several degrees of quality, while the higher the quality of the 
good, the more costly it is to produce it. Second, individuals care about the quality 
of the goods they consume and, moreover, their willingness to pay for higher quality 
of consumption increases with their income. Third, some goods offer larger scope for 
quality upgrading than others, in the sense that it is cheaper to increase their quality. 
Fourth, countries which are similar in terms of their average productivities specialise 
in the production of different varieties of goods according to their intrinsic comparative 
advantages.
The first three elements above give room for non-homothetic demand schedules, where 
the income demand elasticity of different goods is tied to the specific degree of quality 
in which each particular good is (optimally) traded in the market. The last element 
yields patterns of regional specialisation which, combined with non-homothetic demand 
schedules, may lead to divergent dynamics among countries that are initially similar 
concerning capital endowments and income per head. In such a framework, we show 
that international trade may induce income divergence across countries characterised by 
similar initial income levels and with no clear absolute advantages over one another. In 
particular, income divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages dictate 
patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each specific country at a given 
point in time, do not offer the same scope for technological improvements in terms of 
subsequent quality upgrading of final goods.
To convey some preliminary intuition of how non-homothetic demand schedules arise 
as an equilibrium result of our model, it is worth discussing in further detail some of 
the specificities of the commodity space. In that respect, we closely follow the quality 
ladder structure featured in Grossman and Helpman (1991) -  that is, in a continuum 
of horizontally differentiated varieties of goods, an infinite number of qualities for each 
variety are available in the market. Our commodity space is thus bidimensional, with the 
horizontal axis indexing the variety of the good and the vertical axis indexing the quality 
level of a specific variety. Unlike Grossman and Helpman, however, in our framework the 
optimal expenditure shares across varieties do not remain constant as income changes. In 
particular, we postulate that the additional utility the individual derives from a marginal 
increase in the quality of the goods he consumes increases with the quantity of consump­
tion, hence with the individual’s income (in other words, the individual’s taste for quality 
increases with his income). As a result, as individuals become richer they will optimally
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shift resources towards those varieties whose quality can be set at relatively higher levels. 
The budget constraint, in turn, implies that the extent by which quality can be raised for 
any given variety is related to its specific cost of quality upgrading. Thus, the distribution 
of quality upgrading across varieties results from the interaction between the underlying 
technological structure and the response of the consumers’ taste for quality to income 
variations. If the cost of quality upgrading differs across varieties, then the shift towards 
higher-quality goods with rising income will (optimally) occur at different speeds across 
varieties. More precisely, the lower the cost of quality upgrading for a specific variety, 
the faster the speed of quality upgrading for this variety. This uneven climbing-up-the- 
quality-ladder will in turn lead to non-homothetic demand schedules, where the fraction 
of income spent in different varieties depends on the level of income.
To get a glimpse of how the interaction between quality upgrading and comparative 
advantages may lead to divergent income paths through its effect on the evolution of 
trade, take some hypothetical country (call it country Z) that specialises in the variety 
x, which exhibits high cost of quality upgrading.1 According to the mechanism proposed 
in this paper, the speed of quality upgrading for x  will be relatively slow in an equilibrium 
in which world income is growing. Hence, in such an equilibrium, the world expenditure 
share on x will decrease over time. As a result, as the world income rises, Z  will experience 
a decline in its terms of trade, because the types of goods it produces display low income 
demand elasticity.
4.1 .1  A n  Illu strative  H istorical E xam ple -  co lon ia l Jam aica  and pre­
industria l A rgentin a
Situations where the mechanism proposed in this paper may have played an important 
role include the cases of economies for which exogenous initial geographical conditions 
greatly influenced their specialisation in the world economy during some period in history. 
As an illustrative example, take the case of colonial Jamaica and compare to that of pre­
industrial Argentina.
From the second half of the XVII century until the first half of the XIX century, 
the Jamaican economy grew mainly based on the exploitation and export of sugar from 
sugarcane. This is not surprising given the excellent climate conditions this tropical 
island offered for that type of crop. By 1805, Jamaica was the largest sugar exporter in 
the world (Higman, 2005). Given the value attributed to sugar by European consumers, 
during that period Jamaica was deemed probably the most important British colony
JThis specialisation decision might be related, for instance, to geographical conditions influencing the 
technology available in Z.  The following historical example will illustrate this point in further detail.
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in the Americas (Hall, 1959). Although sugar was indeed a very valuable consumption 
good at that time, it clearly was a type of good with very limited scope for undergoing 
subsequent improvements in quality. As such, according to our model, sugar was bound 
to eventually lose its status of luxury among consumers. In fact, by the second half of 
the XIX century, sugar began to lose its economic preeminence in the world markets and 
started experiencing a long phase of declining prices.2
In Argentina, geographical conditions made this country exceptionally apt for the 
breeding of cattle and growing cereals, which constituted the main engines of its economy 
until 1920. The commercial exploitation of cattle started in the late second half of the 
XVIII century with the appearance of the saladeros, where salt-cured beef would be 
produced. Salt-cured beef was a rather unsophisticated product that was mostly exported 
to Cuba and Brazil to feed the slaves there. In fact, the industry of the saladeros did 
not mean a big push to the Argentinean economy, which was at that time still a very 
marginal country within the world economy. The big boom for the cattle industry in 
Argentina actually came about much later with the introduction of the cold storage by 
the end of the XIX century. This technology permitted selling chilled and frozen beef in 
Europe, attracting thus well-to-do consumers from that continent.3 During this period, 
Argentina grew on average at rate of 5% yearly, attracted millions of immigrants from 
Europe and became one of the richest countries in the world.4 The exportation of chilled 
and frozen beef was undoubtedly one of the main activities that spurred this phase of 
fast and steady economic growth in Argentina between 1880-1920.5
The previous example illustrates how exogenous productive conditions greatly influ­
enced the path of GDP growth in Jamaica and in Argentina via the evolution of their 
exports, in the way as our model would predict. Jamaica was comparatively efficient at 
producing sugar, while Argentina enjoyed a comparative advantage in beef production. 
Sugar offered very limited scope for quality improvements, which is analogous to assum­
ing that the cost of quality upgrading for sugar products is extremely steep. On the 
contrary, beef did offer a lot more scope for quality upgrading than sugar, which mate­
2 The decline of the sugarcane industry in Jamaica at that time was also importantly helped by the 
abolition of slavery in 1838, which led to higher labour costs to landowners (Hall, 1959). It can be 
argued, though, that the abolition of slavery was itself an endogenous outcome, and that lower sugar 
prices created an environment more prone to it by diminishing the profits from slavery.
3The main market for Argentinean chilled and frozen beef at that time was by far the prosperous Great 
Britain of end of XIX and beginning of XX century (in 1914, 83.5% of the total Argentinean exports of 
chilled and frozen beef was sent to UK).
4By 1913, the GDP per head in Argentina was similar to that of France and Germany -  Blanchard 
and Perez Enrri (2002).
5The main source of historical information used for this paragraph was Rapaport (1988).
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rialised as the switch from salt-cured beef production (low-quality good) to chilled and 
frozen beef (high-quality good; at least by the end of the XIX century). As predicted by 
our model, sugar exports initially sustained high growth in Jamaica, until rising income 
in the world shifted aggregate demand towards varieties of goods which could be offered 
in higher quality degrees, such as chilled and frozen beef from Argentina.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the set-up of the model. 
Section 4.3 solves the consumer’s problem in a partial equilibrium set-up, illustrating the 
specificities of the non-homotheticity of demand in our model. Section 4.4 computes the 
general equilibrium in the world economy, examining the effects of uniform aggregate 
productivity growth. Section 4.5 concludes. The appendices contain the omitted proofs 
and some additional algebraic derivations used in the main text.
4.2 S tructure  o f th e  M odel
We consider a world composed by two countries: the Home country and the Foreign 
country. For brevity, hereafter we refer to the former as H and to the latter as F. These 
two economies share a common commodity space, defined along two distinct dimensions: 
horizontal and vertical. The first dimension (horizontal) designates the variety of the 
good -  e.g., food, TV, etc. Different varieties are indexed by the letter v along the variety 
space V c K : u G [ 0 , 1 ] ,  The second dimension (vertical) refers to the intrinsic quality 
of the good of a particular variety v -  e.g., organic vs. non-organic food, LCD TV vs. 
cathode ray tube TV, etc. Within each variety v £ V, commodities are vertically ordered 
by the quality-index q belonging to the set Q C R : q € [1, oo), where a higher q denotes a 
higher quality level.6 The commodity space is then given by the set V x Q =  [0,1] x [1, oo), 
and each commodity is identified by a pair (u, g ) e V x  Q.7
We assume that all commodities are tradable. Additionally, we assume there are no 
transport cost and no tariffs affecting international trade.
6 None of the main results of the model depend on the fact that the lower-bound on q is normalised at 
one. Yet, adjusting the model so as this lower-bound is set at zero would greatly increase the algebraic 
complexity of the model.
7In our setup, different varieties should be then understood as groups of commodities that aim at 
satisfying different needs. On the other hand, different qualities for a particular variety refer to the extent 
(or degree) in which the need is actually satisfied by the commodity. In that regard, food satisfies a 
different need when compared to TVs (physiological nutrition vs. visual entertainment), but an LCD TV  
satisfies the need for visual entertainment (objectively!) better than a cathode ray tube TV.
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4.2 .1  P references and B u d get C onstraint
Both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with identical preferences 
defined over the commodity space V x Q .  Whenever it proves needed, hereafter we 
adopt the following notation: unstarred symbols refer to H, starred ones to F.
Denote by xvq 6 R+ the consumed quantity of commodity (v,q ) G V x Q  (i.e., the 
consumed quantity of variety v in quality q) by a representative individual from H. His 
preferences are summarised by the following utility function:
This utility function captures the notion that quality is a desirable feature. However, 
notice that according to specification in (4.1), although quality is never bad, it only 
magnifies the utility derived from (physical) consumption when x vq > 1. This last 
property of (4.1) intends to capture the idea that individuals first seek to satisfy their 
basic consumption needs, and just after these basic needs are met, do they start paying 
attention to the quality dimension of the goods they consume.
Some additional properties about the utility function specified in (4.1) are worth 
noting. First, within each variety v, marginal utility is unbounded above as consumption 
approaches zero, implying that all varieties will be actively consumed in an optimum. 
Second, convexity in quantities of the inner integrals of U means that individuals will 
optimally consume only one type of quality for each variety v. Third, considering two 
different levels of the quality-index q < q for the same variety v, the marginal rate of 
substitution of xvq for xvq is non-decreasing along a proportional expansion path of xvq and 
xvq.8 This last property of (4.1) will allow demand functions to display non-homothetic 
behaviour, where the rich spend a larger fraction of their income in high-qualities than 
the poor.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of effective labour. Labour is immobile 
across countries. As a result, each individual in H supplies inelastically his entire labour 
endowment to domestic firms in return of a wage w G R++ (hereafter, all prices are 
measured in a common numeraire). This wage represents the only source of income for 
the individual. Therefore, his budget constraint reads as follows:
8 To see this, note the M R S ( x Vq , x Vq) is defined by ( d U / d x Vq ) / ( d U / d x vq), and along a proportional 
expansion path x Vq — k x Vq, where k >  0. Then, for x vq, x Vq > 1:
max {xvq, (xvq)q} dq dv (4.1)
(4.2)
M R S ( k x . „ x „ )  =  - k : ' ( i „ , ) , _ i ,-  -  q '
from where it is clear that, along the ray x Vq — k x vg, M R S ( x Vq , xvq) is increasing in x vq.
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where pvq £ R++ denotes the (international) price of each unit of commodity (v,q ) £ 
V x Q .
We define (3V =  w~l f ^ p vqx vqdq as the demand intensity of variety v £ V.9 In the 
optimum, given the specification in (4.1), the budget constraint (4.2) will naturally bind. 
It is thus straightforward to notice that demand intensities will sum up to one across 
varieties (i.e., f Y 0vdv =  1).
All individuals in the world face the same prices for the reproducible commodities. As 
a result, the analogous expressions in (4.1) and (4.2) corresponding to F read, respectively, 
as follows: U* = / v In / Q max {x*vq, ( < 9)9} dg] dv and f v f Qpvqx*qdqdv < w*; where 
w* denotes the wage in F in terms of the common numeraire (clearly, since labour is 
immobile, w and w* need not be equal).
4 .2 .2  T echnology
In both countries competitive firms produce commodities based on linear production 
functions in which labour represents their only input. We let unit labour requirements 
vary both across varieties and across qualities of each variety. Also, we let unit labour 
requirements differ across countries. In particular, in H the unit labour requirement 
for commodity (v, q) £ V x Q  is given by cvq = a (v) qv^  /  ac, while in F is given by 
c*q =  a* (v) qv(v) /k] where k > 0 denotes a world aggregate-productivity parameter, a (v) 
and a* (v) represent variety-specific technological parameters which may differ between 
countries, and p(v) summarises the cost elasticity of quality upgrading for each variety 
v which is assumed to be the same for H and F. We suppose that a (v ) : [0,1] -> R++, 
where a' (•) > 0; analogously, a* (v) : [0,1] -> R++, where a*' (•) > 0. We also assume 
that p (v) : [0,1] - R + + ,  where rf (•) > 0 and p (0) > l .10
The next assumption dictates the pattern of comparative advantages across countries.
A ssum ption  1 Let A (v) =  a* (v) /a (v). We suppose: A  (0.5) =  1 and A' (v) < 0.
Assumption 1 represents the only source of heterogeneity across countries in our 
model. In particular, this last assumption implies that H enjoys a comparative advantage 
in lower-indexed commodities, while F has a comparative advantage in the upper-indexed 
commodities.
9 We borrow this nomenclature from Horvath (2000).
10 From the labour requirements functions it is apparent that qualitative upgrade is costly, which seems 
a natural assumption to make. Additionally, from our assumptions it follows that 77 (v ) >  1 for all n g V ,  
which implies that the marginal cost of improving quality is, for each variety, increasing along the quality- 
space. In that sense, this assumption also seems quite natural, as it reflects the fact that subsequent 
quality improvements become increasingly costly. Finally, note that r)' (•) >  0 -coupled with a' (•) >  0 -  
implies that varieties are sorted by their cost of quality upgrading.
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Note that given the cost functions cvq and c*q specified above, we are allowing coun­
tries to possibly display identical income per-head in equilibrium, since we are not im­
posing any direct source of absolute advantage in the model. Furthermore, notice that 
because p (v) is the same for H and F, the nature of the comparative advantages does 
not change as we move up in the quality-ladder. In that sense, in the model compara­
tive advantages always refer to particular varieties of goods, irrespective of the quality 
at which this variety is actually produced (for example, a country that has a compara­
tive advantage in producing foodstuff, will have this advantage both in organic and in 
non-organic food products).
In our world economy, each country will naturally specialise in those commodities 
which they can produce more cheaply. As a result, the international price of each com­
modity will be given by pvq — min {cvqw,clqw*}. Given Assumptions 1, we can write 
the international price of each commodity (v, q) G V x Q as follows:
Pvq = K_1a  (v ) (pW , (4.3)
where a(v)  = min {a (v) w,a* (v) w*}. In addition, from (4.3) we can determine the 
marginal variety m  (that is, the variety that can be produced by both countries at the 
same cost) as:
w/w* = A( m) .  (4.4)
Equation (4.4) implies that, given the relative wage w/w*, H will produce all the varieties 
in the interval [0,m] and F will produce all the varieties within [m, 1].
4.2 .3  B r ie f R em ark about th e  T im ing in th e  M od el
In the rest of this paper we study the equilibrium solution of the model and perform 
some comparative statics experiments to see how these shocks affect the equilibrium. The 
model is presented as a static one, where the specific equilibria are computed for various 
parametric configurations. However, this static representation of the model should be 
seen just as concise simplification of a dynamic sequence of static problems. Therefore, 
the comparative statics experiments should be accordingly interpreted through a dynamic 
spectacle, where changes in key parameters are to be understood as changes over time in 
the parameters’ values.
Reducing a dynamic model to a static one where agents maximise (4.1) subject to
(4.2), while the technology available in the world determines the prices by (4.3), equals 
to either assuming that agents live for one period and are non-altruistic, or that they
are myopic in some sense. In the former case, we should take the single-period life as a
"condensed" version of an intertemporal problem faced by non-altruistic agents, where
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one period is the relevant unit of time under which to analyse processes of technical 
change of potential importance to our paper. In the latter case, myopia could reflect 
the fact that the scope in terms of future quality upgrading corresponding to different 
varieties of goods is not known ex ante.
4.3 T he In d iv id u al’s O ptim al C on su m p tion  C hoice
In this section we present the optimal consumption choice of a representative individual 
from H, given the set of prices in the world economy. The results so obtained can be 
easily extended to an individual from F, which is done in Appendix .2.
An individual from H chooses the quantities xvq £ K+ to consume of each commodity 
(v, q) £ V x Q to solve the following problem:
In order to solve (4.5), it proves convenient to state the following preliminary results. 
Lemma 7 (Preliminary Results)
(i) For each variety v £ V, at most one quality, denoted henceforth by qv £ Q, is consumed 
in strictly positive amount in an optimum; formally: x vqv > 0, x vq =  0, \ / q ^ q v.
(ii) Take xvqv, Vv £ V. Then: qv > 1 =*► xvqv > 1.
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
From Lemma 7, Part (i), it immediately follows that the income devoted to purchasing 
commodities of variety v is entirely spent on quality qv. Hence, for each v £ V the 
consumed quantity of the optimal quality qv is given by x vqv =  0 vw/pvqv. In addition, 
from Part (ii), it follows that we may replace the inner integral max {x^q, (a;*9)9} dq 
in (4.5) by the simpler expression f Q (x*q)q dq, without altering any of the final results 
of that problem.11
Given Lemma 7 the individual’s optimisation problem in (4.5) can be thus restated 
in a simpler form in terms of two sets of control variables {fiv,qv}veV replacing the set
11 To this more clearly, notice that (keeping in mind the physical constraint x vq >  0) x vqv >  (x vqv)qv 
if and only if x vqv <  1 and qv >  1, which according to Lemma 7, Part (ii) , cannot be true.
max {xvq, (xvq)q} dq dv,max
}(r,g)evxQ
subject to: Jv j3vdv — 1, (4.5)
pvq =  k 1a (v) q ^ v\  V (v, q) £ V x Q.
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of physical quantities { ^ } (V|9)eVxQ' In particular, (4.5) can be restated in the following 
reduced-form:
The first-order conditions corresponding to (4.6) are stated in the Appendix .1. From 
those first-order conditions we may obtain the following expression for each in the 
optimum:
The denominator of the right-hand side of (4.7) can be regarded as an aggregate index 
measuring the optimal consumption bundle’s average quality, and is henceforth denoted 
by Q =  Jv qzdz. Notice that, according to (4.7), the fraction of income spent on variety 
v is determined by its optimal quality relative to the average quality of consumption. In 
that regard, if all varieties were optimally consumed at identical quality degrees (i.e., if 
Qv — Q, Vv G V), then /3V =  1 would hold for all v € ¥ , and our model would behave 
exactly as the one by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977).
4.3.1 D istr ib u tion  o f Q ualities and D em an d  In ten sitie s  across V arieties
Given the technology in the world economy -summarised by k , a  (•) and r] (•)- it is possible 
to characterise the distribution of the optimal qualities across varieties according to their 
position within the set Y. Lemma 8 provides the first result in that direction.
Lem m a 8 Consider two varieties y, v G V, such that y  < v. Then: q„ > qv, with strict 
inequality if  and only if qy> 1.
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
Lemma 8, implies that the consumed quality qv is non-increasing in the variety-index 
v. The underlying intuition for Lemma 8 is straightforward -  those varieties which can 
be more cheaply upgraded tend to be optimally consumed in higher quality levels.
The monotonicity of qv implied by Lemma 8 allows us to split the variety-space in 
two disjoint subsets. The first subset containing varieties that are bound to be consumed 
at the baseline quality level (i.e. with qv — 1) -  these are the higher-indexed varieties. 
The second one comprising the varieties for which the constraint qv > 1 in (4.6) does not 
bind -  these are the lower-indexed varieties. Let us denote by L C V the latter subset.
max
{<lv,Pv}v
subjec t to:
(4.6)
Qv >  1 , V u  6  V ,
Pvqv =  K ~ 1(x  ( v ) Qv^V\  V u  e  V .
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D efinition 3 L e t  L =  (u G V : Xv — 0}, where Xv is the Lagrange m u l t ip l ie r  associa ted  
to the cons tra in t  qv >  1.
R em ark .  Both L =  0 and L =  V are in principle possible. In fact, L =  0 will hold 
if k is sufficiently small, while L =  V will hold if k is sufficiently large. (See Lemma 9 
ahead.)
Lastly, regarding the distribution of the demand intensities, from the condition in
(4 .7) we can observe that, in the optimum, demand intensities are set proportional to
the optimal qualities. As a result, the distribution of /3V across varieties will qualitatively 
mirror that one of qv .
4 .3 .2  E ffec ts  o f A g g re g a te  P r o d u c tiv i ty  S hocks o n  D e m a n d
When the technology is subject to changes, both su b s t i tu t io n -e ffec ts  (due to adjustments 
in relative prices) and incom e-effec ts  (due to the overall effect of variations in produc­
tivity) arise. Here we focus our attention solely on income-effects. In order to isolate 
income-effects from substitution-effects, we let the parameter k  vary, while we keep con­
stant the functions a  (•), a* (•) and 77 (•).
Lem m a 9 L e t  k =  a  (0) exp [77 (0)]. Then:
(i)  f o r  all k  G (0,k) : L =  0;
( i i)  f o r  all k  >  k  : L =  [0,u(k;)], where v ( k ) : [k, 00) —> [0,1], v (k ) =  0, an d  v' (k ) >  0 
w h en ever  v  ( k ) <  1.
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
In short, Lemma 9 implies that the subset of varieties consumed at the baseline  
quality level initially comprises the entire set V, and eventually starts narrowing as world 
aggregate productivity increases beyond the threshold k. The next lemma describes in 
further detail how optimal qualities evolve as the parameter k  changes.
Lem m a 10
i)  I f  k  G (0, k ) :  dq v / d n  = 0 f o r  all v  G V;
i i )  I f  k  >  k : a) fo r  all v  G L, d q v / d n  > 0; b) f o r  all v  L, d q v / d K  = 0; c) f o r  all  
v ,  v  G V, such tha t v < v ,  dq^/dn: >  d c^ /dx , ,  w ith  s t r i c t  inequality  i f  an d  only  i f v E  L.
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
Lemma 10 shows that, for all varieties belonging to L, quality increases when the 
aggregate productivity in the world rises. Furthermore, this effect is stronger for those
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varieties whose quality can be more cheaply upgraded -  i.e., those varieties carrying a 
lower T) (v ). On the other hand, we can observe that the optimal quality of varieties that 
do not belong to L does not respond to (infinitesimal!) changes in k .
Based on Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, we can accordingly identify two distinct regimes 
depending on the level of k that prevails. First, we refer to an economy such that k < k 
as a subsistence economy -  in a subsistence economy all varieties are consumed at the 
baseline quality level. Second, we refer to an economy with k > k as a modem economy 
-  in a modern economy some varieties (and possibly all of them) are consumed strictly 
above the baseline quality level. In what follows we proceed to further characterise these 
two regimes.
Subsistence Economy -  k <  k
In this regime qv — 1 holds for all v e  V. This in turn means that Q =  1 and (3V = 1 
must hold for all v e  V as well. Thus, in a subsistence economy demand intensities 
remain constant and equal to one for all varieties as k  increases.12 In that regard, a 
subsistence economy displays analogous behaviour to the economy discussed in Dornbusch 
et al (1977), where demand schedules are homothetic.
Modern Economy -  k >  k
This regime is characterised by qv > 1 for all v e  [0,f}(/c)). Hence, the average quality 
can be written as Q — 1 — v («) + qz dz, from where it follows that dQ/dn — 
j v ( k )  ^z > q since dqv/dn  =  0 for all v £ L, then because of (4.7), d(3v/dn < 0
must hold for all v <£ L. As a result, given that f v /3v dv — 1, it must thus be the case 
that the demand intensities of some (and possibly all) v e h  will increase as k rises. Let 
I  C V denote the subset of V comprising all those varieties for which d/3v/dn > 0.
Definition 4 Let 1 =  { v  e  V : d(dv/dK >  0}.
In a subsistence economy JT =  0, while in a modern economy J  ^  0. In other words, in 
a modern economy the homotheticity of demand intensities no longer holds, as a subset 
of varieties whose income demand elasticity is larger than one shows up. Notice finally 
that I d ,  since dqv/dK > 0 is a necessary condition for d(3v/dsi > 0 to hold.
The next proposition further characterises the behaviour of the demand intensity (3V 
of a generic variety v,  in relation to those of the other varieties, as k rises.
12It must be noted that this result applies only if k <  k holds after performing the comparative statics 
exercise.
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Proposition 8 Consider any two varieties v, v G V, such that v < v .  Then:
i) If  V. € I :  d f i j d n  > dpy/dn;
ii) Ifvtfz J: dPy/dn < 0.
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
To interpret our previous results more clearly, notice that J may be understood as 
the set of luxury goods, where by luxury goods we refer to those varieties whose income 
demand elasticity is larger than 1. Since the set J  always comprises lower-indexed vari­
eties, the luxury goods are exactly those varieties whose quality degree qv is relatively 
high compared to the average quality Q. In that sense, in our model it is the (relative) 
quality what determines whether or not a particular variety is luxurious. When individu­
als are still poor (i.e., when k < k), satisfying all basic needs constitutes their main goal, 
leading them to keep the quality of all goods at the baseline level and setting accordingly 
equal expenditure shares for all varieties. As individuals become rich enough some (and 
eventually all) varieties start being consumed in higher quality degrees. Additionally, 
the varieties whose quality degree is relatively higher attract increasingly larger income 
shares, as given the preference specification in (4.1) individuals tend to value high-quality 
commodities relatively more as they become wealthier. This last point becomes more ap­
parent in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Let $ (v) = Jq (3z dz. Then:
(i) I f  k  < k  : dti (v) / 3 k  = 0, V u  G V;
(ii) If  k > k : dd (v) /dn > 0, Vu G [0,1).
Proof. See Appendix .3. ■
Corollary 3 synthesizes the eventual non-homothetic behaviour of the demand sched­
ules implied by our model. In particular, whenever k < k, demand schedules are homo- 
thetic across varieties. However, when k lies above the threshold k , income starts being 
spent in growing proportion on lower-indexed varieties.
4.4 G eneral Equilibrium  in th e  W orld E conom y
In Section 4.3, we have studied the optimal consumption choice of an individual from H, 
taking the wages in H and in F, w and w*, as exogenously given. (In Appendix .2, we 
do the same for the case of an individual from F.) These wages in turn determine the 
prices of all reproducible commodities in the world economy through equation (4.3). Our 
former analysis has therefore yielded only partial equilibrium results.
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The present section computes the general equilibrium in this world economy. This 
requires endogenising wages and, thereby, the prices of all reproducible commodities. 
Given that in a general equilibrium only relative prices are determined, we henceforth 
take the wage in F as the numeraire, by setting w* =  1.
In order to disregard the effects of heterogeneous population size in different coun­
tries, we suppose that both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with 
identical mass, which we normalise to one. (We explore the general equilibrium effects 
of heterogenous population size and population growth later on in Section 4.4.2.)
A representative individual from H will then solve:
The solution of (4.8) and (4.9) yields the demand functions of each variety v 6 V 
by H and F, respectively. By using d (u) = J^ (3Z dz -as defined in Corollary 3- and 
d* (v ) — Jq fi*dz -see Corollary 3 (Foreign) in Appendix .2-, we can write the equilibrium 
condition for the market of goods produced in H as follows:
Condition (4.10) essentially says that the aggregate amount of income spent by the world 
in goods produced in H must be equal to the aggregate income of H. This condition can 
also be understood as the equilibrium condition for the labour market in H.13
The world economy general equilibrium is determined by (4.4), (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10). 
We will henceforth focus our attention on the equilibrium values of w and m, and to how 
these two variables respond to some simple comparative statics exercises.
4.4 .1  W orldw ide U niform  A ggregate P r o d u c tiv ity  G row th
In this subsection, we look at the impact of changes in ac on the equilibrium values of w 
and m. We can split the results in two different cases.
13 Because of the Walras’ Law, an analogous condition can be derived for the equilibrium in the labour
{9to/3v }„ev
max dv,
(4.8)
subject to:
V
0V dv =  1; and qv > 1, Vu G V.
On the other hand, a representative individual from F solves:
max dv
(4.9)
subject to: /  (3*dv = 1; and q* > 1, Vu £ ¥ .
J V
d (m ) w + d* (m) =  w. (4.10)
market in F.
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Subsistence economies — x < x
From our previous discussion, we can observe that when x < x, the optimal demand 
intensities are set at j3v =  /3* =  1 for all v e  V. This result in turn implies that 
i? (m) =  (m ) = m. Therefore, (4.10) simplifies to:
w — m /  (1 — m ) . (4-11)
Combining then (4.4) with (4.11), leads to m /  (1 -  m) =  A(m),  from where it follows 
that, for all x < k, in equilibrium: w =  1 and m = 0.5. That is, H and F exhibit the 
same level of income, and the pattern of regional specialisation is accordingly dictated by 
the “natural” comparative advantage of each country without relative-wage bias (i.e., the 
comparative advantage that derives purely from the heterogeneity in the technological 
structure implied by Assumption l) .14
Modern economies -  x >  x
When aggregate productivity is sufficiently high, the income equality between H and F 
no longer holds. In particular, as x rises above the threshold x, the terms of trade start 
moving in favour of H, and thus H becomes relatively richer than F. Furthermore, the
income disparity between H and F increases as x  keeps rising.
Proposition 9 Suppose Assumptions 1 holds. In addition, suppose x  > k. Then, in 
equilibrium:
(i) w > 1 and m < 0.5.
(ii) dw/dK > 0 and dm/dx, < 0 .
Proof. Part (i). When k > k, from Corollary 3 it follows that d(m) > m and
$*(ra) > m. As a result, by using (4.10), we can obtain:
d*(m) m
u: — \ , \ > z ------- • 4.121 — v{m) 1 — m
Combining next (4.12) with (4.4), and recalling Assumption 1 leads to:
i?*(m) mA(m) =  ---- — -  >  ------  &  m <  0.5.1 — v{m) 1 — m
Finally, since m < 0.5, (4.4) implies that w > 1.
14Notice that, since w — 1 for all k <  k , in fact k =  k * (that is, the threshold on k that divides a 
subsistence-economy from a modern economy happens to be the same for both H and F). As a conse­
quence, we can refer to both thresholds simply as k .
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P a r t  (ii). Next, to study how w and m  vary as k keeps rising above k , we differentiate 
the equilibrium conditions (4.4) and (4.10). This leads to:
dw , dm . v
T k = a  (m)^  (413)
and
(  dd{m) a/ N dw , ( d#(m) dtf*(m)\ dw
+ ^ ) ^  + {w f a T  +  *(•») +  “ S T )  t o  + +  - a T " J = ^  ■
(4.14)
where the first term in (4.14) uses the fact that d'd(m)/dm =  /3m and d,d*(m)/dm = 
Plugging (4.13) into (4.14), we can obtain:
dm d'd(m)/dK + d'd*(m)/dn (4 IS)
dn [1 -  i?(m) -  w d ,d{m)/dw -  d$*(m)/dw] A'(m) — {w(3m +  f3*m)
For determining the sign of (4.15), we can use the following two results: first, Corollary 
3 states that both d'&(m)/dn > 0 and d,d*(m)/dK > 0; second, as shown in Appendix 
.4, d'd{m)/dw < 0 and d'd*{m)/dw < 0. Therefore, since 1 — $(ra) > 0 and A'(m) < 0, 
then dm/dn  < 0 obtains from the right-hand side of (4.15). Finally, from (4.13) it then 
follows that dw/dn  > 0. ■
Proposition 9 shows that as the worldwide productivity parameter, k, increases, the 
income in H eventually begins diverging away from the income in F. The reason for 
the divergence lies in the fact that H enjoys a comparative advantage in lower-indexed 
varieties, which tend to be consumed in relatively higher quality levels and display accord­
ingly higher income demand elasticity. As a consequence, as the world economy grows 
uniformly above k, aggregate world expenditure shifts towards the set of commodities 
produced by H. The ensuing excess demand for commodities produced in H causes excess 
labour demand in H and w thus goes up. In turn, as w rises, the marginal variety moves 
to the left (i.e., m  falls), and some of the varieties that used to be produced by H start 
being now produced by F, restoring the equilibrium in the labour markets.
4.4 .2  Som e O ther C om parative S ta tics  E xercises
This subsection briefly studies the results of two other comparative statics experiments 
commonly explored by the previous literature on international trade with non-homothetic 
preferences. First, we look at the case of income inequality within countries. Second, we 
analyse the effects of unequal population growth across countries. It turns out that the 
results of both exercises are in line with those of the literature on North-South trade. 
On the one hand, income inequality within countries tends to improve the terms of trade 
and the relative income of the economy that specialises in varieties that display higher
81
income demand elasticity. On the other hand, the country in which population grows 
faster tends to experience a decline in its terms of trade and relative income.
H eterogeneous P opulation : th e  effects of incom e inequality
So far we have assumed that within each country all individuals are identical regarding 
all relevant features for our model. In this section we examine the general equilibrium 
consequences of introducing some degree of income heterogeneity within countries.
To keep the analysis short and concise, we first introduce income inequality only 
in F, while we maintain the assumption that the population in H is homogeneous. In 
particular, we assume that F is inhabited by two types of individuals: p and r, where the 
p stands for poor and r stands for rich. Each sub-group of foreigners has mass equal to 
0.5. A type-p is endowed with 1 — i units of effective labour, while a type-r is endowed 
with 1 + i units of it; where i G (0,1). In H everyone is endowed with 1 unit of effective 
labour.
Introducing income inequality in F leads to interesting results when the types-p are 
so poor that, in equilibrium, they consume all varieties at the baseline quality level, 
whereas in contrast the types-r can afford consuming some of the varieties strictly above 
that level. To focus on such case, we accordingly assume that k =  k.
P roposition  10 Suppose the population in F is split in two groups, p and r, of equal 
mass; individuals in p are endowed with 1 — t units of effective labour and individuals 
in r are endowed with 1 + i units of it, where i > 0. Additionally, suppose that k =  k. 
Then, in equilibrium:
(i) w > 1 and m  < 0.5.
(ii) dw/di  > 0 and dm/d i  < 0.
Proof. P a r t  (i). When /c =  «, in F, d*(m) = m  and tf*(m) > m; where tfj(m) denotes 
the fraction of income that types j  E {p, r} spend on varieties belonging to [0,m). On 
the other hand, in H, d(m)  =  m; since when k = k all individuals from H optimally 
consume all varieties at the baseline level.15 As a result, the equilibrium condition in the 
labour market in H reads as follows:
m w  + \  [(1 -  i )m  +  (1 +  L)d*(m)] = w. (4.16)
From (4.16), since d*(m) > m, it immediately follows that w > 1, which in turn implies 
m < 0.5.
15Recall from Lemma 9 that k  =  a (0 )exp  [7 7(0 )], which is independent of w /w * .
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P a r t  (ii). Totally differentiating (4.16), and using the fact that in equilibrium dw/du =
A'(m) (dm/dt)  must be verified, leads to:
dw = ____________________________( 1  +  l )  {dd*/dt) +  -  m)____________________________ >  Q
dc 2(1 -  m) -  (1 + l) (dd*/dw) -  [2w +  (1 -  t) + (1 + M '(m )
The positive sign in (4.17) stems from the fact that d'd*{m)/di > 0, d$*(m)/dw < 0, 
and A'(m) < 0. ■
When k  =  k, introducing income inequality in F raises the relative wage in H. This 
result is owing to the non-homotheticity of the demand schedules of the rich foreigners. 
More precisely, increasing l  transfers income from the poor foreigners who spend a fraction 
m  of it in goods from H, to the rich foreigners who spend a fraction $*(m ) > m  of their 
income on those commodities. As a result, aggregate demand for goods produced in H 
goes up leading to higher w.
Incorporating inequality in H in an analogous manner as done before in F would 
carry similar consequences on w and m. This is the case because the rich locals would 
tend to shift aggregate demand towards the goods produced in H, exactly as it occurred 
in Proposition 10 with the rich foreigners. The next proposition states this result more 
formally.
P roposition  11 Suppose the population in H is split in two groups, p and r, of equal 
mass; individuals in p are endowed with 1 — l units of effective labour and individuals 
in r are endowed with 1 - f t  units of it, where l > 0. Additionally, suppose that k = k. 
Then, in equilibrium:
(i) w > 1 and m  < 0.5.
(ii) dw/dt > 0 and dm/d i  < 0.
P roof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 10. See Appendix .3. ■ 
P opula tion  G row th
In this section we return to a situation in which all individuals in the world are homoge­
neous (hence, we disregard again inequality issues). However, we let the population size 
in F be larger than in H.
Let the total mass of individuals in F equal L > 1. Then the labour market equilib­
rium condition in H will be given by:
d(m)w + Z/#*(ra) =  w. (4-18)
Visual inspection on (4.18) and (4.10) -combined with (4.4)- immediately implies that 
the equilibrium value of w that is delivered by (4.18) will be strictly larger than that
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yielded by (4.10). In particular, in equilibrium w > 1, regardless of the value of k . The 
next proposition shows that this source of income divergence between F and H is stronger 
the larger the value of L.
P roposition  12 The relative wage in H is increasing in the size of the population in F.
Proof. Totally differentiating (4.18), and bearing in mind that dw/dL = A'(m) (d m / d L ) 
must hold in equilibrium, leads to:
where the positive in (4.19) obtains from dfi(m)/dw < 0, d’&*{m)/dw < 0, and A'(m) < 
0. ■
When the labour supply in F increases, the relative wage w must go up so as to 
accommodate the excess supply of labour in F. More precisely, a larger L requires more 
goods to be produced by F in order to keep full employment there; this is accomplished 
by letting w go up, which in turn shifts the marginal variety m  to the left, helping restore 
the equilibrium in the labour markets.
4.5 C onclusion
We have provided a model of international trade based on comparative advantages that 
are unrelated to the relative stage in the process of development in which countries are. 
This is the main point of departure with respect to the past literature on North-South 
trade, where comparative advantages originate from the fact that some countries have 
historically accumulated larger amounts of capital than others. We show instead that 
even when no single country enjoys a clear absolute advantage over any other country and 
when productivity changes are uniform and identical in all countries, international trade 
may still be the source of income divergence in the world economy. Income divergence 
will be experienced when comparative advantages induce patterns of specialisation that, 
although optimal for each country at early stages in the process of development, do not 
offer the same scope for improvements in terms of quality upgrading of final products in 
the long run. We have argued that our model may shed light on historical cases where 
comparative advantages emerged as a result of heterogeneous geographical conditions.
dw w 1  — ■tf(m) > 0. (4.19)
dL L
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A p pend ices
.1 F irst-O rder C on ditions for C onsum ption  C hoice in H
The optimisation problem in (4.6) yields the following first-order conditions (where p. rep­
resents the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and (A ^j^y denote 
those associated to the constraints {qv > l}u6V):
l n ( . nM I - ’) W + A» = ° .  V« S y ; <2° )
f -  -  M =  o , V u  e  V ;  (2 1 )
Pv
qv — 1 > 0, Xv > 0, and Xv (qv — 1) =  0, Vv £ V; (22)
1 -  [  /3v dv = 0. (23)
J  v
From (21), it follows that fiv = qv/\x. Then, replacing this last expression into (23) leads 
to Jv qz dz =  /r, from where the condition (4.7) immediately obtains by using again (21). 
By using the condition (4.7), we can rewrite (20) as:
Xv — V (v ) -I- In [a (v ) /w] -  In k -f- In Q +  [q (v) -  1] ln ^ .  (24)
The expression in (24) will be used in many of the following proofs.
.2 O ptim al C onsu m ption  C hoice in  F
Bearing in mind Assumption 1, we can write down the optimisation problem faced by a 
representative individual from F as follows:
max U* = [  In [  max {x*vq, (xlq)q} dq 
J V J o
dv,
{ X t ' « } ( „ , , ) € V x  Q
subject to: Jv P^dv — 1,
Pvq = K ^ q V ^ a  (v ), V (v, q) 6 V x Q.
Lemma 7 holds for x^q in a similar fashion as for x vq. Hence, we can re-state the 
problem specified above in terms of q* and /?*, as it was previously done for H (where q* 
now denotes the quality of variety v consumed, in the optimum, in F). This way, we can 
obtain the following first-order conditions, which constitute the analogous versions for F 
of (4.7) and (24), respectively:
«  = (» )  
K  =  Viv) +ln[a(v)/u>*] - ln /c  +  lnQ* + [rj (v) -  ljlng*. (26)
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Given the first-order conditions in (25) and (26), all the ensuing results found in 
Section 4.3 follow through in qualitative terms. In particular, we can derive functions 
{<7*}veV and {fd*v}v€V displaying identical qualitative properties as their counterparts in H, 
that is {qv}vey and {Pv}vey, in terms of Lemmas 8 - 10 and Proposition 8 . Furthermore, 
we can similarly find the threshold k* for the worldwide aggregate-productivity para­
meter, which splits F in the regimes of subsistence-economy and modem-economy, both 
exhibiting analogous properties as described for H .16 Finally, likewise for H in Corollary 
3, for F the following holds:
C orollary 3 (Foreign) Let d* (v ) = /3* dz. Then:
(i ) If k < k* : dd* (v ) /<9ac =  0, Vv G V;
(ii) If k > k* : dd* (v) /dn  > 0, Vu € [0,1).
.3 O m itted  Proofs
P ro o f of Lem m a 7.
P a r t  (i). First, notice that utility is given by an additive function over logarithms. 
Optimization can thus be split in two stages: (a) maximise U with respect to the loga­
rithms; (b) maximise those logarithms with respect to xvq. About (b), notice that the 
logarithms are defined on the integral over convex functions of x vq, and therefore are 
themselves convex functions. It follows that (b) optimally requires corner solutions, so 
the result claimed obtains.
P a r t  (ii). The proof follows immediately from noting that, for all v 6 V, utility derived 
from consuming xvq G (0 , 1] is independent of the quality-index q, while according to 
(4.3) the price of commodity (v, q) € V x Q is strictly increasing along the quality space.
■
P ro o f of Lem m a 8 .
First, suppose q„ < qy. Since > 1, then q¥ > 1 , hence (24) paired with (22) yield: 
rj (u)-f ln[a (n) /w] - In  (n/Q) > 0 , while rj (v )+ ln[a  (v) /w\  - I n  (k/Q)  + [ti (v) -  l ] l n ^  = 
0. Thus:
rj (n) +  In a (v) >77 (v) +  In a  (v) + [77 (v) -  1] In q¥.
This last equality in turn leads to:
[77 (v) -  77 (n)] +  In [a (v) / a  (n)] + [77 (v ) -  1] In qy < 0 ,
which cannot possibly hold if q^ > 1, as its left-hand side would then be strictly positive. 
Therefore, it must necessarily be the case that qv > qy.
16From Section 4.4 ,  it is straightforward to observe that, given Assumption 1, k* =  k.
Next, suppose q^ — q^> 1. In this case, (24) in conjunction with (22) yield:
77 (v) -f- In a (v) + [77 (v) -  1] In =  77 (v) +  In a (v) +  [rj (v) -  1] In qy — 0.
This last equality in turn leads to:
-  [V (v) -  V (v)] (1 +  ln 9^) =  ln [Q 07) / a («)] •
However, this last equality cannot possibly hold since its right-hand side is strictly posi­
tive, while the left-hand side is negative. As a result, qR > qv must necessarily hold when 
qv > I- ■
P ro o f of Lem m a 9.
In order to prove this lemma it proves convenient to state first the following result: 
C laim  1 The optimal quality qv of any variety v £ V can be written as follows:
qv =  max (9o)T°’" , l}  ; (27)
2^°)a(0)'
where:
$0,1; = zn(v)a (v)
r,(u)_1 77 CO) — 1> 0, and TQ^ y =     > 0.
T}(v)~ 1 
Proof. See Appendix .4.
Next, notice that, from (27), <94>o,v (v) /dv < 0 and 8 TqjV (v ) /dv < 0 since a' (v) > 0 
and rf (v) > 0, hence the set L C V comprises the lower-indexed varieties in V, with u(k) 
representing its upper bound.
P a r t  (i). When k £ (0, k), conditions stipulated in (22) and (24) applied on v =  0 entail 
that: qo — 1 and Ao > 0 . As a result, from Lemma 8 it follows that qv = 1, Vv £ V. 
Therefore, since a' (v) > 0 and rf (v) > 0, again from (24), Xv > 0 for all v £ V obtains, 
and thus L =  0.
P a r t  (ii). Note that (24) applied on v — 0, in conjunction Lemma 8, implies that when 
k = k, then Ao =  0 and qo = 1 . Then, Lemma 8 implies Q =  1. Using these results in 
(24) yields: Xv — q (v) +  In [a (v) /w) — In k, implying that Xv > 0 for all v £ (0,1]. As a 
result, the set L =  0, meaning that v ( k ) — 0.
C laim  2 If u(k) < 1, then q$(K) =  1.
Proof. See Appendix .4.
Given Claim 2 and Lemma 8, the aggregate quality index can be written as follows: 
Q =  1 — v ( k ) +  Jq ^  qv dv. Furthermore, observe that, whenever v ( k ) <  1, In ( k / Q )  =  
77 (v ( k ) ) +  In [ a  (v ( k ) )  / w ] must hold in equilibrium. This last condition yields, after some 
simple algebra, Q =  /cwexp [-77 (u)] / a (v). In addition to that, because of Lemma 8, in
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equilibrium, [77 (v) -  1] lnqv =  In (k/Q) - r j ( v ) -  In [a (v) /w] must hold for any v < v ( k ). 
By using the former in the latter, after some algebra, we may obtain:
qv =  Qv {v { k ) )  =
a (v ( k ))
1
’t] ( v ( k )) -7](v)
a(v)
exp rj(v) — 1  .
, Vv G[0 , v(k)]. (28)
In equilibrium, it must be the case that:
r v { K )
K i v e x p [ - r )  (v ( k ) ) ] / o, ( v ( k ) )  =  1 — v ( k ) +  /  qv ( v ( K , ) ) d v ,
Jo
(29)
where the right hand-side of (29) uses (28). Computing the total differentiation of (29), 
yields after some algebra:17
^d K
leading finally to:
a '  (v ( k ))
a(v(K))
+  7/  (v ( k )) Q +
c v { k )
Jo
Qv dv dv,
dv
dn
k  /  a '  (v ( k )) r v ( n )
'(«) + Jo
77(77) -qvdv
-1
> 0.
Q \a (v (K))  ' '' ^  ~v' v JQ 77 (u) — 1
where the last inequality follows from the properties of the functions a  (•) and 77 (•) ■ 
P ro o f of Lem m a 10.
P a r t  (i). Proof follows immediately from noting that Lemma 9 implies that, whenever 
k G (0,«), qv =  1 must hold for all v G V. Thus, whenever k  G (0,k), dqv/dn — 0 for all
v G V.
P a r t  (ii.a). Differentiating (27), computed for any v G L, with respect to k  yields:
dqv 77 (0) -  1 
dn
Mo) “ (0)
(v)r j { v ) - l
Using again (27), the equation above can be written:
dQv V (0) ~  1 qv dqo
n(0 )-v(v)  rfnn
(qo)  V u  G L.dK
, Vu G L. (30)dK 77 (v) — 1 qo dK
(Since r)(-) > 1, notice that d q v / d K  and d q o / d K  must then share the same sign, for all 
v G L). Given that Q = 1 — v ( k )  + /q ^  qz d z ,  it follows that:
^ ( k )  r l n  1 (  f v ( K )dQ
dK
= n  d± d z = 1  r
J o  d *  qo \ J 0 77 ( z ) dK
17One subtle caveat applies here. Even if both w a (v ) and w*a*(v) are differentiable functions over the
whole domain of v, the envelope function a(u) will not necessarily be so. In particular, a (v )  may not be
differentiable at the point v =  m. As a result, if v  =  m, a!{v ) may not exist. In the very specific case
where this “anomaly” holds, we take that a  (u) =  lim  U
v '  A . - . 0 +  A v
Applying (24) to v =  0 when Aq =  0 yields: qo = [a (0) ,/(0) 1 1. Thus:
- l
dqo _  qo Q
d K r) ( 0 )  — 1 k
> 0.
Therefore, from (30) it follows that d q v / d K  > 0 , Vu € L must also hold.
P a r t  (ii.b). Since qv — 1 must hold for all v £ L. Proof is analogous to that of Part (i) 
of this Proposition.
P a r t  (ii.c). Part (ii.a) and (ii.b) of this Proposition, taken together, imply that dq^/dn — 
dqy/dK =  0 if u, v ^ L, and dqy/dK > dqy/dK — 0 if v G L and v £ L. For v,v  € L, such 
that v < v, (30) leads to:
since by assumption rj (v) < q (v) and, from Lemma 8 , qv > qu■ ■
P ro o f of P roposition  8 .
Firstly, considering the definition of average quality, taking logarithms and differentiating
(4.7) with respect to k  yields: (d/3v/dK) //3V =  (dqv/dK) /qv — (dQ/dK) /Q. Using (30), 
we can write:
P a r t  (i). Using (31), the claim trivially follows by noting that, from Lemma 8 in 
conjunction with (4.7), f3v > /3F must always hold.
P a r t (ii). Suppose instead that d f i v / d k  > 0 when d(3v / d K  < 0. Using (31), it follows 
that:
which contradicts the fact that d ^ / d K  >  0  when d/3v / O k  < 0 .  As a result, if v £  J ,  then 
d/3v/8 k < 0 must hold. ■
P ro o f of Corollary 3.
Preliminarily, recall Jz e V /3z d z  = 1, which implies (d/3z / d K ) d z  — 0.18
P a r t  (i). Claim immediately follows since, whenever k  <  k , d/3z / O k  =  0  for all z  6  V .  
P a r t  (ii). Note first that when k  >  k , the set J  /  0. As a result, from Proposition 8,
18Note that it is then trivial to observe that <9$(1)/3k =  0, Vk >  0.
dqy _  r}(0 ) -  1 qy dqp 77 (0) -  1 qy dqp _  defy
dK 77 (v) — 1 qo dK rj (v ) — 1  qo dK dK
dq^  1 _  77 (0 ) — 1 dqo  1 77 (0 ) — 1 dqo  1 dqy  1
dK qy rj (v) — 1 dK qo 77 (u) — 1 d K qo d K q-y'
Hence:
d/3y 1 d(3y 1
dK f3v dK (3¥ ‘ (31)
dK j3v dK
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Part (i), it follows that £  (d/3z/dn) dz > £  (d(3z/dK.) dz. Then, since £  (5/3z/3k)  dz + 
£  (df3 z/dK) dz — 0, we must necessarily have that £  (df3z/dK) dz > 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 11.
Part (i). The equilibrium condition for the labour market in H is as follows:
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\  [(1 -  l) m  +  (1 4- L)dr(m)] +  — = 1. (32)
From where w > 1 and m  < 0.5 immediately obtain since dr(m) > m.
Part (ii). Totally differentiating (32), and using the fact that in equilibrium dw/di  =
A'(m)  (d m /d t ) must be hold, leads to:
dw = ________________(1 +  l) (ddr/di) +  (dr(m) -  m)________________
dt 2 m w ~ 2 — (1 +  i) (d d r / d w ) — [2 w ~ l -f  (1 — l) +  (1 +  / A ' ( m )
The positive sign in (33) stems from the fact that ddr(m)/di  > 0, d,dr(m)/dw < 0, and 
A'(m)  < 0. ■
.4 A uxiliary  D erivations and P roofs
Proof of Claim 1
Recall that qv =  1, Vu ^ L. For all other varieties, (24) in conjunction with (22) yield:
77 (v) -f In a (v) +  [77 (u) -  1] In qv = 77 (0) + In a (0) +  [77 (0) -  1] In q0, \fv € L. 
Isolating [77 (v) — 1] lng„, and applying exponentials to both sides gives:
<«'),,(’)‘ i = S f S (* ),’<0)' 1- v o e L -
Finally, raising both sides to the power [r)(v) -  I]-1 , and considering Lemma 8 , (27) 
obtains.
Proof of Claim 2
By definition of L, A =  0. Thus, the condition (24) applied on v(k) yields:
77 ({;(«)) +  In [a (v(k)) / w\ -  In k +  In Q = — [77 (v(k)) -  1] In qd{K) (34)
Suppose now that > 1, and take some e G (0,1 -u(k)]. Then, since v = v (k)+£ £ L,
it must be the case that:
77 (v(k) +  e) + In [a (v(k) + e) /w] -  In k +  In Q = A5(<t)+e. (35)
Then, by continuity of rj (•) and a (•), and using the result in (34), we must have:
lim {77 (v(k) + e) +  In [a (v(k) +  e) /w] -  In k + In Q} = -  [77 (v (k)) -  1] Inqc(lt) < 0.
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Hence, q^K) > 1 cannot possibly hold when v ( k ) < 1 as it would imply that AC(K)+e < 0 
in (35) for e  —> 0, violating (22).
Proof of d'd{m)/dw < 0.
Suppose first that v < m. Then, L C  [0,m). Differentiating (24) with respect to w yields:
2 W z i a ? . +  i » 0 =  0 , v , e L . (36)
qv dw Q dw 
Furthermore, from (27) it follows that:
g f t  =  ’h ° ) - . 1. g » g g ° ,  V„ e L . (37)
dw rj (v) — 1 qo dw
Since dQ/dw = f ” (dqz/d w )d z , combining (36) and (37) yields:
V Jo *1 (z ) ~ 1 /  9 o  Q  <9™ <9™
Therefore, using again (37), dqv/dw  =  0 for all v G [0,v] obtains. In addition, because 
of Lemma 8, it must thus be the case that dqv/dw  =  0 holds as well for all v G (v, 1].
Finally, recalling (4.7) it then follows that dj3v/dw  =  0 for all v G ¥ , which in turn
implies that dti (m) /dw — 0.
Suppose now that v > m. Differentiating (24) with respect to w now yields:
t] (v) -  1 dqv | 1 dQ = f 0, Vu G [0, m)
qv dw Q dw |  l /w,  Vu G [m,v]
From (38) it follows that a necessary condition for d'd{m)/dw > 0 to hold is that 
dQ/dw < 0.19 However, (38) means that if dQ/dw < 0, then dqv/dw  > 0 should hold for 
all v G [m, v]. If v — 1, it must be straightforward to observe that dQ/dw < 0 cannot thus 
hold. Alternatively, if v < 1, then dQ/dw < 0 would require that dqv/dw < 0 prevails for 
some v G (v , 1] which is not feasible either since it would lead to violating the constraint 
qv < 1. As a result, dQ/dw > 0 must hold, which in turn implies dfi (m) /dw < 0. ■
P ro o f of d-d* (m) /dw < 0.
Suppose first that v* < m. Then, L*C [0,m). Differentiating (24) -  adjusted for repre­
senting an individual from F -  with respect to w yields:
<39>q* dw Q* dw w
19Otherwise, if d Q /d w  >  0, (38) would imply that dqv/d w  <  0 for all v  6 [0,m ). Recalling (4.7), it 
is then straightforward to observe that d Q /d w  >  0 would mean d/3v /d w  <  0 for all v €  [0, m ), which in 
turn leads to d d  (m ) /d m  <  0.
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In addition, from (27) it follows that:
dqt _  (0) -  1 q* dgp Vv e L*_
dw rj (v) — 1 dre '
(40)
Combining (39) and (40) leads to:
w dw
Hence, using again (40), dql/dw < 0 for all v G [0,u*] obtains, which in turn implies 
dQ*/dw < 0. Next, since for all v > v* the constraint g* > 1 is binding, it must be the 
case that dq*/dw > 0, Vu € (£*,1]. As a result, because of (4.7), dfi*/dw > 0 for all 
v G [m , 1] follows, which in turn implies d'd* (m) /dw < 0.
Suppose now v* > m. Differentiating (24) with respect to w now yields:
Suppose dQ*/dw > 0. From (41) it follows that dq*/dw < 0 for all v G [0, u*). Further­
more, Lemma 8 then implies that dq*/dw < 0 for all v G [v*, 1]; as a result, dQ*/dw < 0 
must necessarily hold. Now, notice that if dQ*/dw < 0, then (41) implies dq*v/dw  > 0 
for all v G [m,u*]. Moreover, in case v* < 1, since Vu G (v*, 1] the constraint q* > 1 is 
binding, dq*/dw > 0 must necessarily hold for all v G (v*, 1]. As a result, if dQ*/dw < 0, 
then d(3*/dw > 0 for all v G [m, 1], which in turn leads to d'd* (m ) /dw  < 0 . ■
(41)
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